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NAVIGATING LEGALITIES IN CRISIS
STANDARDS OF CARE*
JAMES G. HODGE, JR., J.D., LL.M.**
JENNIFER L. PIATT, J.D.***
REBECCA FREED, J.D. CANDIDATE****
As originally conceptualized by the Institute of Medicine in 2009, crisis
standards of care (CSC) refers to significant changes in the delivery of health
services during sustained public health emergencies (PHEs). Implementation of
CSC among hospitals and health care providers arises when extended patient
surges combined with scarce or limited resources overwhelm health systems and
derail normal operations. Absent well-timed, organized, and critical
interventions, excess patient morbidity and mortality may follow. Preventing the
onset of CSC through advance planning and real-time effort is key. When CSC
is justifiably invoked, saving lives and reducing morbidity through effective
interventions are the end goals. Multiple national and regional PHEs shaped
CSC in concept and practice over the decade since its inception. Yet,
unprecedented public health impacts and resource scarcities during the COVID19 pandemic necessitated repeated shifts to CSC in hospitals, localities, or entire
states in a dynamic and unpredictable emergency legal environment. Profound
law and policy repercussions emerged, centering on: (1) confusion over
affirmative legal triggers for CSC invocation; (2) gaps and gaffes in regional
coordination within and across jurisdictions; (3) discriminatory impacts of CSC
allocation decisions based on race, disability, age, or other unwarranted factors;
and (4) divergent criteria to resolve tie-breaking decisions over which patients
should receive limited resources (e.g., ventilators, beds, and staff). Future
solutions to these challenges are vital to assuring efficacious and equitable
implementation of CSC whenever lives are on the line.
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INTRODUCTION

In the midst of the H1N1 pandemic in 2009, a Committee of the Institute of
Medicine (IOM Committee) defined crisis standards of care (CSC) as a
“substantial change in usual healthcare operations and the level of care . . .
resulting from a pervasive or catastrophic disaster.”1 Abandoning prior, longstanding terminology focused on “altered standards of care,”2 the IOM
Committee’s definition of CSC centered on making critical choices concerning
the allocation of health services, supplies, treatments, or personnel in dire
circumstances.3
CSC is not about how to respond to an uptick of patients on a busy night at
the local hospital emergency room. Transitions from conventional to
contingency standards of care are routine in U.S. hospitals and other major health
care providers.4 CSC arises when more substantial changes in health care
delivery are warranted over longer periods of time.5 It entails the shifts needed
when extended patient surges coupled with scarce or limited resources in public
health emergencies (PHEs) overwhelm health systems and make normal
operations infeasible.6 IOM (now enveloped in the National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM)) observed that, absent critical
interventions defying routine medical standards during PHEs, excess patient
morbidity and mortality may result.7
As explored in Part I, two primary bases conceptually underlie CSC.8 First,
prevention is vital—advance planning and preparedness can limit situations
1. INST. OF MED. COMM. ON GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING STANDARDS OF CARE FOR USE IN
DISASTER SITUATIONS, GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR USE IN DISASTER
SITUATIONS: A LETTER REPORT 18 (Bruce M. Altevogt et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter IOM, CSC LETTER
REP.].
2. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RSCH. & POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PUB. NO.
05-0043, BIOTERRORISM & OTHER PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES: ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE IN
MASS CASUALTY EVENTS 8 (2005) (prepared by Health Systems Research, Inc.).
3. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Practical, Ethical, and Legal Challenges Underlying Crisis Standards
of Care, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 50, 51–52 (2013).
4. See John L. Hick et al., Refining Surge Capacity: Conventional, Contingency, and Crisis
Capacity, 3 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS s59, s60 (2009) (defining “conventional
capacity” as “consistent with daily practices within the institution” and “contingency capacity” as “not
consistent with daily practices but maintain[ing] or hav[ing] minimal impact on usual patient care
practices”); see also James G. Hodge, Jr. & Brooke Courtney, Assessing the Legal Standard of Care in
Public Health Emergencies, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 361, 361–62 (2010) (proposing that a physician’s
legal standard of care in a crisis situation “should be based on how a practitioner acts consistent with the
need to protect community health in accordance with established national and state crisis standards of care
plans or real-time emergency practices”).
5. See IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 18 (explaining that CSC is “necessary by a pervasive
(e.g., pandemic influenza) or catastrophic (e.g., earthquake, hurricane) disaster” and is formally declared
by “state government, in recognition that crisis operations will be in effect for a sustained period”).
6. Id. at 52–53.
7. Id. at 63–64.
8. See infra Part I.
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requiring shifts to crisis modes.9 Second, saving lives is the end goal—when
circumstances merit CSC implementation, allocating scarce health care
resources focuses on preventing excess morbidity and maximizing lives saved.10
Determining when shifts to CSC are truly warranted is key. Although the genesis
for conceiving CSC, the H1N1 pandemic proved to be little more than a glancing
blow epidemiologically.11 Over the ensuing decade, other domestic public health
crises (including Ebola viral disease,12 Zika virus,13 and illicit opioid use14) led
NASEM to revisit and reassess the concept and implementation of CSC.15
Still, nothing could adequately prepare national public health and health
care systems for the pervasive CSC-related challenges that arose during the
COVID-19 pandemic,16 as examined in Part II.17 Unprecedented public health
impacts from the worst infectious disease threat in modern history wreaked
havoc on health systems and exposed major health disparities across subpopulations nationally.18 In the U.S. alone, COVID-19-related deaths exceeded
830,000 in less than two years.19 Massive patient surges coupled with insufficient
onsite personnel, beds, treatments, or supplies necessitated repeated shifts to

9. See IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 13–14 (explaining that health care facilities must
create “surge plans that include efforts to increase and maximize use of available resources, as well as to
manage demand for healthcare services”).
10. See id. at 30 (explaining the “duty to steward scarce resources, reflecting the utilitarian goal of
saving the greatest possible number of lives”).
11. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Global Legal Triage in Response to the 2009 H1N1 Outbreak, 11 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 599, 599–600 (2010) (noting that although the H1N1 pandemic was not as large a threat
as predicted, it was the first time that the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a PHE
internationally).
12. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Is the United States Prepared for Ebola?, 312 JAMA 2497, 2497
(2014) (explaining that “the handling of the first domestically diagnosed Ebola case in Dallas, Texas,
raised concerns about national public health preparedness”).
13. See Michael A. Johansson et al., Zika and the Risk of Microcephaly, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1,
2–3 (2016) (“Recent studies have revealed associations between symptomatic ZIKV infection during all
trimesters and adverse pregnancy outcomes and potential peak risk during gestational weeks 14 to 17.”).
14. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Reframing the Opioid Epidemic as a National Emergency, 318
JAMA 1539, 1539–40 (2017) (arguing that states and the federal government have used limited emergency
declarations to combat health crises such as the Zika virus and opioid epidemic).
15. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE: TEN YEARS OF
SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES –PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP 7–8, 43–44 (2021), https://www.nap.
edu/read/25767/chapter/1#ii [hereinafter NASEM, CSC WORKSHOP]; James G. Hodge, Jr., Revisiting
Legal Foundations of Crisis Standards of Care, 48 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 221, 221–22 (2020).
16. See John L. Hick et al., Crisis Standards of Care and COVID-19: What Did We Learn? How Do
We Ensure Equity? What Should We Do, NAT’L ACAD. OF MED., PERSPS., Aug. 30, 2021, at 1–3
(“COVID-19 has fundamentally challenged the delivery of health care services across the world, forcing
difficult choices on health professionals and laying bare many preexisting health, medical, and public
health sector frailties.”).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. COVID-19 Dashboard, JOHNS HOPKINS CORONAVIRUS RES. CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/
map.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) [hereinafter JHU Dashboard].
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CSC in specific hospitals, localities, or entire states (e.g., Alaska, Arizona, Idaho,
Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico).20 Many health care personnel and
hospitals experienced full-scale implementation of CSC for the first time while
facing a dynamic and sometimes unpredictable legal environment that
obfuscated decision-making.21
Profound legal repercussions arose from efforts to avoid or effectuate CSC
in real time.22 As assessed in Part III, despite a decade of advance planning, some
state health officials and hospital executives were loath to implement CSC—or
even admit it was needed—absent a definitive trigger for its invocation.23 Failure
to uniformly execute CSC exacerbated poor health outcomes among
subpopulations, especially in states where political leaders acted contrary to
public health powers and science under principles of “COVID denialism.”24
Even when CSC was clearly authorized, a lack of intra-jurisdictional
coordination as well as inter-jurisdictional boundary disputes across state lines
impinged efforts to allocate scarce resources for the benefit of patient
populations.25
Resource allocations based on divergent criteria or varying prognostic
scores across states contributed to widespread, disparate impacts on the basis of
race, age, disability, and socioeconomic status.26 Decision-makers likely did not
intentionally discriminate against subgroups when distributing resources. Yet,
the disparate results of such decisions cannot be ignored. Persons of color, certain
ethnic groups, and those of advanced age or with specific disabilities all
experienced higher levels of mortality during the COVID-19 pandemic.27
20. See infra Part II.B, Part III.A; Charlie Smart, Covid Hospitalizations Hit Crisis Levels in Southern
I.C.U.s, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/09/14/us/covid-hospital
-icu-south.html.
21. ERIC TONER ET AL., CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK CITY HOSPITALS’
COVID-19 EXPERIENCE 1, 3–4 (2020), https://www.gnyha.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/1_20201124
-NYC-csc.pdf.
22. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., RAPID EXPERT CONSULTATION ON CRISIS STANDARDS
OF CARE FOR THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 3, 3–6 (2020) [hereinafter NASEM, CSC RAPID
CONSULTATION].
23. See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Jennifer L. Piatt, Legal Decision-making and Crisis Standards of
Care, JAMA HEALTH F., Jan. 21, 2022, at 2 [hereinafter Hodge, Jr. & Piatt, Legal Decision-making]
(noting reticence among specific hospitals to implement CSC); Hick et al., supra note 16, at 3 (describing
varied circumstances and reasons why jurisdictions varied on their authorization of CSC or invocations of
their plans); see also Anuj B. Mehta & Matthew K. Wynia, Crisis Standards of Care—More Than Just a
Thought Experiment, HASTINGS CTR. REP. 53, 53 (2021) (arguing that activation of CSC plans “remains
a political decision”).
24. See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Legal Interventions to Counter COVID-19 Denialism, 49 J.L.,
MED. & ETHICS 677, 677 (2021) [hereinafter Hodge, Jr., Legal Interventions] (explaining that, during the
pandemic, states “dismissed emergency declarations, banned mask requirements, prohibited vaccine
mandates or passports, limited social distancing, and [forbade] school or business closures”).
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. Hick et al., supra note 16, at 2–3.
27. See infra Part II.A, Figure 3.
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Underlying reasons for these disparities were numerous, including CSC
implementation.28 To address certain emerging disparate outcomes, federal and
state health authorities mandated mid-pandemic legal adjustments to public or
private sector CSC plans and approaches.29 These new approaches, while
necessary, further obfuscated CSC execution.30
Allocating scarce resources proved exceedingly difficult and controversial
in “tie-breaking” scenarios, where multiple COVID-19 patients simultaneously
needed access to intensive care unit (ICU) beds, ventilators, or health care
personnel, all of which were in short supply.31 Rapid, consistent decisions based
on solid legal and ethical guidance were called for.32 In reality, such guidance
was confusing or missing entirely.33 Tie-breaking criteria set forth in state-based
CSC plans varied extensively.34 Lacking definitive legal and ethical guidance,
some clinicians resorted to ad hoc or ill-advised decision-making35—the
antithesis of CSC.
Our proposed solutions to the primary legal challenges underlying CSC—
(1) triggers for invocation; (2) regional coordination; (3) discriminatory impacts;
and (4) tie-breaking decisions—are designed to guide current and future
exercises of CSC in furtherance of the ultimate public health goal: saving lives.
I. CSC IN CONCEPT AND PRACTICE
As the spread of novel H1N1 influenza threatened the nation in the late
summer months of 2009, fifteen members of the IOM Committee on Guidance
for Establishing Standards of Care for Use in Disaster Situations gathered in
Washington, D.C. over four days.36 Led by co-chairs Lawrence O. Gostin, J.D.,
and Dan Hanfling, M.D., the Committee was tasked by the Assistant Secretary
28. Emily Cleveland Manchanda et al., Inequity in Crisis Standards of Care, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1, 1–2 (2020) [hereinafter Manchanda et al., Inequity in Crisis Standards of Care].
29. Jennifer L. Piatt & James G. Hodge, Jr., Crisis Standards of Care: Legal Issues Underlying Key
Decisions Regarding Scarce Resources, NETWORK FOR PUB. HEALTH L., June 2021, at 4–7,
https://www.networkforphl.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Issue-Brief-CSC-Legal-Issues-UnderlyingKey-Decisions-Regarding-Scarce-Resources.pdf [hereinafter Piatt & Hodge, Jr., Crisis Standards of
Care].
30. See infra Part III.C.
31. Hodge, Jr. & Piatt, Legal Decision-making, supra note 23, at 1–2.
32. Id.
33. See infra Part III.D.
34. See infra Part III.D, Figure 6.
35. See Hick et al., supra note 16, at 8 (suggesting that during the pandemic many clinicians “felt
forced to make ad hoc decisions at the bedside,” including “implicit or covert triage decisions being made
by clinicians who believed that the resource situation was worse than it was, and/or determined on their
own accord that a patient should not be offered certain interventions”); Mehta & Wynia, supra note 23, at
54 (lacking CSC activation, “soul-crushing decisions were left to bedside medical teams, potentially
poisoning the therapeutic bond between patients and clinicians and contributing to psychological and
moral distress”).
36. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 16.
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for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) with “developing guidance to establish
standards of care that should apply to disaster situations . . . under conditions in
which resources are scarce.”37 What the IOM Committee generated in its draft
Letter Report later that month,38 and subsequently revised over the following
decade, would have enormous impacts in the greatest public health challenge the
nation would ever experience.
A. Conception
The IOM Committee’s conception of CSC in 2009 began with a newly
formalized definition.39 After receiving extensive input through an initial public
workshop, Committee members looked beyond previous conceptions of “altered
standards of care.”40 They sought medical and public health clarity amid chaos
when extensive patient surges coupled with dwindling resources necessitated
sustained shifts in standards of care. CSC was defined and framed as:
“[A] substantial change in usual healthcare operations and the level of
care it is possible to deliver, which is made necessary by a pervasive
(e.g., pandemic influenza) or catastrophic (e.g., earthquake, hurricane)
disaster. This change in the level of care delivered is justified by
specific circumstances and is formally declared by a state government,
in recognition that crisis operations will be in effect for a sustained
period. The formal declaration that [CSC is] in operation enables
specific legal/regulatory powers and protections for healthcare
providers in the necessary tasks of allocating and using scarce medical
resources and implementing alternate care facility operations.”41
Basic conceptual parameters of CSC emerged from this definition. It is not
about shifts from conventional to contingency care on a hectic day at the hospital
emergency room or clinic. Hospitals and other health care providers frequently
experienced limited patient surges and knew how to handle them.42 To the
contrary, CSC involves (1) “substantial changes” in routine “healthcare
operations” and “level of care” (2) due to “pervasive” or “catastrophic”
disasters.43 Shifts to CSC are purposeful, not happenstance. They are (3) justified
by “specific circumstances” through “formal declarations” by state

37. Id. at 10.
38. Hick et al., supra note 16, at 2–3, 5.
39. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 3.
40. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RSCH. & POL’Y, supra note 2, at 2 (finding that many health
systems lacked proper planning and guidance necessary to implement “altered standards of care” in the
event of mass casualty).
41. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 3.
42. See id. at 14–15 (explaining the differences between “conventional,” “contingency,” and “crisis
care”).
43. Id. at 18.
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governments.44 Such declarations can be pivotal to (4) enable legal “powers and
protections” essential to (5) “allocating and using scarce medical resources” and
(6) “implementing alternate care facility operations.”45 In sum CSC entails the
organized shift to a different standard of care during emergencies, facilitating
specific interventions for patients to protect the public’s health.46
How to operationalize CSC based on these definitional criteria in major
disasters or PHEs dominated the IOM Committee’s deliberations.47 Members
outlined and crafted a series of recommendations to enable identification, uptake,
and implementation of CSC across public and private sectors.48 As per Figure 1,
the Committee developed a systems approach to CSC built on foundational
ethical and legal principles.49
Figure 1. Systems Approach to CSC50

Equity was essential. CSC had to be fair, evidence-based, procedurallysound, transparent, and grounded in assuring patient care.51 Implementing CSC
should not focus on denying or diminishing patient care or ignoring health care
workers’ (HCWs) ethical responsibilities to provide the highest level of medical

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 18–20.
Id. at 18–20, 24–26.
INST. OF MED. OF NAT’L ACADS., CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE: A TOOLKIT FOR INDICATORS &
TRIGGERS 18, fig. 1–2 (Dan Hanfling et al. eds., 2013).
50. Id.
51. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 6.
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care and services. Rather, during crises, scarce resources should be used “to
sustain life and well-being to the greatest extent possible.”52 Meeting this
objective requires responsivity to community needs and trust through active
engagement and avoidance of discrimination,53 especially concerning
populations that have historically been marginalized, persons with special
medical needs or disabilities, and children.54
Additional guidance and facets essential to effective CSC implementation
were articulated. While state or tribal public health agencies were tapped to lead
CSC development within each jurisdiction, contributions from other
governmental agencies were also anticipated.55 As illustrated by the architectural
columns depicted in Figure 1, diverse health care providers had roles to play in
planning for and effectuating CSC, including “emergency medical services and
dispatch, public health, hospital-based care, home care, primary care, palliative
care, [and] mental health.”56 This purposeful “all hands on deck” approach to
CSC was intended to help assure consistency in resource allocations and
decision-making within and across states.57
Proper execution of CSC should avoid ad hoc decision-making over
allocations of limited, life-sustaining resources to the degree that such choices
contribute to excess mortality.58 Use of advisory committees, triage teams, or
other entities capable of vetting evidence-based critical care options and tools
were suggested to improve consistency in making tough choices.59 Assuring
situational awareness capacities to wield and share real-time data was a core
obligation of state or tribal CSC planners tasked with generating plans based on
the IOM Committee’s deliberations.60 To date, roughly 30 states have crafted
their own CSC plans, many with the support of federal hospital preparedness
funds.61
52. Id.
53. INST. OF MED., CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE: A SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR CATASTROPHIC
DISASTER RESPONSE 2–4 (2012) [hereinafter IOM, CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE].
54. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 42.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08668, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: STATES ARE
PLANNING FOR MEDICAL SURGE, BUT COULD BENEFIT FROM SHARED GUIDANCE FOR ALLOCATING
SCARCE MEDICAL RESOURCES 6 (2008) (recommending that the federal government “serve as a
clearinghouse for sharing [. . .] altered standards of care guidelines that have been developed by individual
states or medical experts” to increase consistency and uniform guidance).
58. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 66.
59. Id. at 24–25.
60. Id. at 60–61.
61. There is some disagreement as to exactly how many states have formally developed and posted
CSC plans. For example, Kaiser Health News reported that, as of March 2020, 36 states have CSC plans.
Markian Hawryluk, During a Pandemic, States’ Patchwork of Crisis Strategies Could Mean Uneven Care,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://khn.org/news/during-a-pandemic-states-patchwork-ofcrisis-plans-could-mean-uneven-care/. However, other sources published in similar time frames indicated
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B. Legal Assessment
In addition to emphasizing various ethical and organizational factors, the
IOM Committee also highlighted pivotal legal considerations undergirding the
successful invocation and implementation of CSC.62 As per Figure 1, “legal
authority and environment” constituted cornerstones of CSC.63 Laws were
deemed essential in clarifying “prevailing standards of care” and incentivizing
actors to “protect the public’s health and respect individual rights.”64 Through its
deliberations and recommendations, the IOM Committee outlined an expansive
slate of legal issues for assessment by state or tribal CSC planning committees,
selectively encapsulated in Table 1.
Table 1. Select Legal Issues Regarding CSC Implementation65
SUBJECT

Organization of
Personnel

LEGAL ISSUES
• How are employees, independent contractors, and
volunteers legally distinguished for the purpose of
coordinating services and benefits?
• Do existing labor contracts or union requirements
affect the ability of the entity and its personnel to
respond to an emergency?
• Have appropriate contractual or other mechanisms
been executed to facilitate the delivery of services
by employed or volunteer personnel, ensure worker
safety, or make available workers’ compensation or
other benefits?

slightly lower numbers. See, e.g., Emily Cleveland Manchanda et al., Crisis Standards of Care in the USA:
A Systematic Review and Implications for Equity Amidst COVID-19, 8 J. RACIAL & ETHNIC HEALTH
DISPARITIES 824, 824 (2020) [hereinafter Manchanda et al., Crisis Standards of Care in the USA]
(identifying 29 state CSC plans); Douglas Romney et al., Allocation of Scarce Resources in a Pandemic:
A Systematic Review of US State Crisis Standards of Care Documents, 14 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH
PREPAREDNESS 677, 677 (2020) (identifying 31 state CSC plans).
62. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 44.
63. See supra Figure 1 (depicting the other cornerstone of CSC as “ethical considerations”).
64. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 6.
65. Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 3, at 53, tbl. 1.
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SUBJECT

Access to
Treatment

Coordination of
Health Services

Patients’ Interests

Allocation of
Resources

LEGAL ISSUES
• Has the entity assessed its strategy for conducting
medical triage under legal requirements for treating
existing and forthcoming patients?
• Is the entity prepared to screen and potentially
divert excess numbers of patients during an
emergency consistent with the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),
absent its waiver?
• Do healthcare personnel who are designated to treat
existing and forthcoming patients pose any risks to
patients?
• Are healthcare personnel aware of the legal effects
of a shift to CSC and changes relating to scopes of
practice during a declared emergency?
• What is FDA’s authority to issue emergency use
authorizations, including accompanying mandatory
information for patients and providers?
• Are adequate mechanisms in place to ensure
compliance with surveillance, reporting, testing,
screening, partner notification, quarantine, isolation,
or other public health mandates?
• Can patients with physical or mental disabilities be
accommodated during the emergency consistent
with disability protection laws?
• Are there appropriate measures to ascertain patients’
informed consent?
• Barring waiver, are the entity and its personnel
prepared to respect patients’ health information
privacy rights?
• Is the process for allocating scarce resources fair,
reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and credibly based
on protecting the public’s health?
• Are federal, state, or local policies regarding
resource allocation followed?
• Can governments appropriate existing resources
(with just compensation) for communal purposes
during an emergency?
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SUBJECT

LEGAL ISSUES
• When may the entity and its personnel be liable for
their actions in treating patients via CSC?
• What legal protections from liability for entities,
their healthcare personnel, independent contractors,
Liability
or volunteers (including insurance coverage) apply?
• May entities and their personnel face potential
liability for failure to adequately plan or train for
emergencies?
• Are there established reimbursement protocols for
treating patients?
• Are private health insurers or other payers legally
required to reimburse for care delivered to patients
in furtherance of the public’s health?
• Are entities organized to seek federal and state
Reimbursement
reimbursement through the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) or other sources for
care delivered in off-site facilities?
• Have federal/state authorities accelerated, altered, or
waived Medicare/ Medicaid requirements for
reimbursement?
• Has the entity executed memoranda of understanding
or other agreements to facilitate interjurisdictional
Interjurisdictional
coordination of emergency health services?
Cooperation
• Is the entity’s all-hazards emergency plan integrated
with community-level emergency planning and
objectives?
The capacity of CSC implementers to properly assess and wield law
depends substantially on the extant legal environment during crises. The IOM
Committee expressly tied CSC invocation and implementation in part to formal
declarations of emergency at the federal, state, tribal, or local levels.66 This was
designed to assure available legal options needed to effectuate shifts to CSC. As
seen during the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
governmental declarations of states of emergency, disaster, or PHE authorize a
plethora of options supporting CSC execution, including: (1) expedited powers
to acquire and allocate scarce resources; (2) waivers of existing laws impeding
public health or healthcare efforts; (3) emergency executive orders allowing
licensure reciprocity of HCWs across states; (4) expansions of HCWs’ scope of
practice to increase their utilities during emergencies; and (5) liability protections
to insulate specific actors or entities against patient claims alleging ordinary acts

66. Id. at 52.
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of negligence.67 These emergency powers, however, are not instantaneous,
assured, or uniform. Within the U.S. federalist legal infrastructure, there is no
single, national means to authorize all of the core powers needed to
operationalize CSC. Their invocation relies on the specific type of emergency
declared (e.g., “emergency,” “disaster,” “PHE”) in each jurisdiction68 as well as
real-time “legal triage” efforts to identify and overcome perceived or actual
barriers.69
Thus, CSC planners must carefully consider varied approaches to shifting
standards of care in jurisdictions that formally declare emergencies as well as
those that do not. The IOM Committee observed the potential for legal conflicts
to arise across jurisdictions through efforts to balance individual and communal
interests in emergencies.70 Among the clearest illustrations of legal variances
relates to liability risks and protections for health care providers. The risks of
liability during catastrophic events rightly concern HCWs and entities. To the
extent CSC may involve temporary set-asides of routine standards of care due to
scarcity, clinicians may have to resort to providing patient care that does not
resemble normal, efficacious interventions. Negative patient outcomes otherwise
preventable in non-emergencies may result.
From patients’ perspectives, adverse health consequences may appear to
fall below the standard of care, lending to claims of medical malpractice.71 Highprofile cases involving health care practitioners72 and hospitals73 after Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 and the Ebola outbreak in 201574 exacerbated liability concerns
among many HCWs and hospitals. Two divergent law and policy approaches
attempt to address these concerns over potential or actual liability during CSC
by:
(1) relying on shifts to CSC to ward off potential claims since actions
deemed injurious to patients would be assessed under a different

67. Id.
68. JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH IN A NUTSHELL 368 (4th ed. 2022) [hereinafter HODGE,
JR., NUTSHELL].
69. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage During Public
Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 273 (2008).
70. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 6.
71. Michealle Carpenter et al., Deploying and Using Volunteer Health Practitioners in Response to
Emergencies: Proposed Uniform State Legislation Provides Liability Protections and Workers’
Compensation Coverage, 3 AM. J. DISASTER MED. 17, 18 (2008).
72. Adam Nossiter & Shaila Dewan, Patient Deaths in New Orleans Bring Arrests, N.Y. TIMES (July
19, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/us/19patients.html?pagewanted=all.
73. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Erin F. Brown, Assessing Liability for Health Care Entities That
Insufficiently Prepare for Catastrophic Emergencies, 306 JAMA 308, 308 (2011).
74. Polly J. Price, Quarantine and Liability in the Context of Ebola, 131 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 500,
502 (2016).
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standard of care. So long as health care falls within the prevailing
CSC, medical liability should not follow;75 or
(2) providing explicit statutory or regulatory protections for
negligence claims against clinicians or entities involved in
administering CSC.76
Reliance on the “status quo” for assessing medical malpractice liability
during crises under the first approach is premised on (a) scant evidence of
extensive claims following emergencies (thus disclaiming the need for broad,
sweeping protections proposed in the second approach), and (b) alterations in the
standard of care as sufficient to obviate any claims that do arise.77 As the IOM
Committee observed, these premises are debatable. Numbers of liability claims
arising from major emergencies are largely indeterminate. What is much better
known is how HCWs’ perceptions of significant threats of liability may militate
against their overall willingness to respond in emergencies.78 Just because the
medical standard of care may change in emergencies does not mean the legal
standard aligns later. Assessing breaches of the standard of care in subsequent
judicial settings is factually precarious.79
Consequently, federal and state governments have implemented an array of
liability protections via statutes, regulations, executive orders, or agreements
immunizing health care clinicians, volunteers, and even entities from negligence
claims resulting from actions undertaken during declared emergencies.80 Under
a collective umbrella of liability protections, illustrated in Figure 2, healthcare
providers are partly relieved of the specter of negligence or unfounded liability
claims extending from their implementation of CSC.

75. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 866 (Miss. 1985) (“Medical malpractice . . . arises from
the failure of a physician to provide the quality of care required by law. When a physician undertakes to
treat a patient, he takes on an obligation enforceable at law to use minimally sound medical judgment and
render minimally competent care in the course of the services he provides. A physician does not guarantee
recovery. If a patient sustains injury because of the physician’s failure to perform the duty he has assumed
under our law, the physician may be liable in damages.”), superseded by statute, MISS. CODE ANN. § 855-7 (West 1989), as recognized in Narkeeta Timber Co. Inc. v. Jenkins, 777 So.2d 39, 42 (2000).
76. HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 68, at 392–402.
77. George J. Annas, Standard of Care – In Sickness and in Health and in Emergencies, 362 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2126, 2130 (2010).
78. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 45.
79. Hodge, Jr. & Courtney, supra note 4, at 361–62.
80. See Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health
Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1937–50 (2006) (discussing the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact, regional mutual aid agreements, Good Samaritan statutes, the
Volunteer Protection Acts, the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, the Project BioShield
Act, immunity, and general emergency state statutes).
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Figure 2. Umbrella of Prospective Liability Protections During CSC

Advocates of the first approach are concerned that patients adversely
affected via negligence lack recourse under the second approach. However,
patients or their families may be entitled to emergency compensation funds or
other remedies, including claims alleging willful, wanton, or criminal acts.81
Virtually no legal immunities protect health care providers against such claims.
In addition, not all providers are covered in every circumstance. For-profit health
care entities and employees may not enjoy the same level of protection from
liability as volunteer agencies or health personnel.82 Finally, many of these
protections endure only through the limited timeline of declared emergencies.
Once an emergency is revoked via executive officials, legislators, or judges,
many liability protections tied to the declaration fall away.
C. Legal Evolutions
From the onset, legal issues underlying CSC in practice were seen by the
IOM Committee as dynamic, not static. Evolutions were inevitable as CSC plans
emerged from state and tribal governments offering their own ideas, concepts,
criteria, and implementation. Table 2 illustrates diverse approaches among select
jurisdictions’ plans in defining CSC. While these definitions of CSC resonate
themes originally espoused by the IOM Committee, they also reveal differing
approaches, justifications, and triggers.

81. Id.
82. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF
VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, https://www.phe.gov/esarvhp/Pages/faqs.aspx#Safety (last visited
Feb. 12, 2022).
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Table 2. Select Definitions of CSC in State Plans
STATE

Alabama

California
Colorado

Kansas

Massachusetts

Minnesota

CSC DEFINITION
“[A] substantial change in usual healthcare operations and the
level of care possible to deliver due to severe shortages of
critical resources causing the delivery system to be
overwhelmed. It is a medico-legal term meaning the prudence
and caution required of an individual or organization which
is operating with a duty of care to people under the care of the
individual or organization.”83
“Disaster strategies used when demand forces choices that
pose a significant risk to patients but is the best that can be
offered under the circumstances.”84
“[T]he demand for care surpasses resource supply despite
contingency care strategies. Normal quality standards of care
cannot be maintained.”85
“[P]rinciples and practices that health care providers, acute
care hospitals, and communities . . . can utilize . . . in the
event that resources become scarce during a disaster or
[PHE]” invoked “only after a declaration of emergency and
only after other specified means of procuring additional
resources and expanding surge capacity have been
exhausted.”86
“Adaptive uses of space, staff, and supplies that are not
consistent with usual standards of care, but provide
sufficiency of care in the setting of a catastrophic disaster
(i.e., provide the best possible care to patients given the
circumstances and resources available).”87
“[W]hen scarcity of resources relative to demand becomes
acute and it is no longer possible to provide care that is
functionally equivalent to conventional care” such that the
“response must focus on the overall benefit to the population,
to try to minimize morbidity and mortality, while also

83. ALA. CRISIS STANDARDS CARE GUIDELINES WORK GROUP, ALABAMA CRISIS STANDARDS OF
CARE GUIDELINES 1, 4 (2020), https://www.alabamapublichealth.gov/cep/assets/alabamacscguidelines
2020.pdf.
84. CAL. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, CALIFORNIA SARS-COV-2 PANDEMIC CRISIS CARE GUIDELINES 1, 4
(2020), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/CDPH%20Document%20Library/COVID-19/
California%20SARS-CoV-2%20Crisis%20Care%20Guidelines%20-June%208%202020.pdf.
85. COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T., CDPHE ALL HAZARDS INTERNAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE & RECOVERY PLAN 1, 19 (2021), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pH6RF2Wi4h0vTE6Bb5u
BUzeTspUZhNhQ/view.
86. KAN. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T, TOOLKIT FOR COVID-19 4–5, 7 (2020), https://int.nyt.com/
data/documenthelper/6847-kansas-triage-guidelines/02cb4c58460e57ea9f05/ optimized/full.pdf.
87. EXEC. OFF. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., CRISIS STANDARDS OF
CARE PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 7 (2020), https://s3.documentcloud.org/
documents/6843353/Revised-Crisis-Standards-of-Care-Planning-Guidance.pdf.a
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STATE

Montana

Utah

Washington

CSC DEFINITION
respecting rights and promoting fairness across our
population.”88
“A substantial change in usual healthcare operations and the
level of care it is possible to deliver, which is made necessary
by a pervasive . . . or catastrophic . . . disaster. This change
. . . is formally declared by a state government in recognition
that crisis operations will be in effect for a sustained period
. . . [,] enabl[ing] specific legal/regulatory power and
protections for healthcare providers in . . . allocating and
using scarce medical resources and implementing alternate
care facility operations.”89
Equitable “allocation of scarce patient care resources during
an overwhelming [PHE] when the demand for services
dramatically exceeds the supply of the resources needed.”90
Invoked “when there are not enough healthcare staff, space,
or supplies to provide normal care to patients. Usually, this
happens in an event when there is a large number of people
needing care, such as a pandemic, or a disaster (natural or
man-made).”91

When NASEM convened a tenth anniversary workshop on November 21–
22, 2019,92 participants (including multiple original members of the IOM
Committee) raised prominent concerns over the utility of CSC. Two compelling
law and policy issues focused on (1) indeterminate legal triggers justifying shifts
to CSC; and (2) evidence underlying core medical and public health choices
made during PHEs.93
As explored during the workshop, diverse health care crises are defined by
their context, duration, and impacts. What constitutes a crisis can differ

88. MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSITIONS BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL,
CONTINGENCY, AND CRISIS CONDITIONS IN PERVASIVE OR CATASTROPHIC PUBLIC HEALTH EVENTS
WITH MEDICAL SURGE IMPLICATIONS: MINNESOTA CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE 2, 6 (2021),
https://www.health.state.mn.us/communities/ep/ surge/crisis/framework_transitions.pdf.
89. MONT. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SCARCE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT & CRISIS
CARE GUIDANCE 1 (2021), https://dphhs.mt.gov/assets/publichealth/CDEpi/DiseasesAtoZ/2019-nCoV/
MontanaCrisisCareGuidance OverviewMaterials.pdf (quoting IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1).
90. UTAH HOSP. ASS’N CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE WORKGROUP, UTAH CRISIS STANDARDS OF
CARE GUIDELINES 2 (2020), https://coronavirus-download.utah.gov/Health/Utah-Crisis-Standards-ofCare-Guidelines-v9-11122020.pdf?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=b0048439-52ad-4640-a7b4ed4b51286f1c.
91. WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, WASHINGTON STATE CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE TRIAGE TEAM
OPERATIONAL GUIDEBOOK 58 (2021), https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/821-151CSC-TT-guidebook.PDF.
92. NASEM, CSC WORKSHOP, supra note 15, at 4.
93. Id. at 43–44.
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considerably between large metropolitan or smaller regional hospitals.94
Formally shifting to CSC is problematic, however, when definitive legal triggers
(e.g., emergency declarations) are either unavailable, tenuous, or inconsistent.95
Dissimilarities related to the use, timing, scope, and breadth of emergency
declarations and authorities across jurisdictions raise additional complications.96
In jurisdictions that engaged in advanced CSC planning and training, legal
options to effectuate CSC may be relatively clear. Elsewhere, CSC
implementation may be averted absent a clear trigger.
Even when CSC is legally authorized, substantiating the bases for
allocations of medical or public health services is perilous. Although advance
efforts to avoid the need for real-time resource allocations should be undertaken,
CSC invocations may be inevitable in specific cases or environments. Resulting
tough choices regarding population- and patient-based care must be made.
Decisions like when to allocate or withdraw essential health care services are
ethically thorny but legally substantiated by a need to allocate limited resources
to improve health outcomes across affected populations.
What if the bases for implementing CSC decisions were
contemporaneously or later proven to lack medical support in actually reducing
morbidity or saving lives? In essence, what if triage committees or clinicians
essentially get it wrong in allocating limited resources? Making “right” decisions
during CSC is difficult when peoples’ lives are directly at stake. In 2009, the
IOM Committee acknowledged these risks, highlighting how CSC fluctuates
depending on existing conditions.97 Implementing CSC entails making
defensible decisions to advance patient interests and protecting communal health
based on the best available medical and public health evidence.98 If responses to
crises follow sufficient processes and are guided by reliable medical or public
health findings, they may be legally sustained despite negative impacts for select
patients or subpopulations.
What if the entire foundation for making these critical choices in crisis lacks
efficacy? Acknowledging a lack of strong, empirical evidence underlying CSC
protocols or implementation, NASEM workshop participants called for more

94. Hodge, Jr., supra note 15, at 222 (“For large health systems or entities in metropolitan areas, a
crisis might arise from a MCE like an explosive detonation (e.g., Boston Marathon bombing 2013) or
active shooter tragedy (e.g., Las Vegas concert (2018)). Dozens, hundreds, or thousands of persons may
be immediately imperiled by such acts, testing the surge capacity of even well-staffed and equipped
hospitals . . . In smaller jurisdictions, HCWs may perceive a crisis following a surge of patients from a
vehicular collision on a nearby highway.”).
95. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Legal Crises in Public Health, 47 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 778, 779–80
(2019).
96. HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 68, at 390–92.
97. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 15.
98. Id.
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research.99 Yet the premise was also raised whether to abandon CSC absent proof
of effectiveness. This was a contentious point in late 2019. Without CSC
planning and execution during PHEs, allocation decisions may be based on little
more than ad hoc judgments, random selections, or physician favoritism. None
of these factors should guide distributions of routine medical care, much less care
in crises. Determining how to make allocation decisions without complete data
or proof of medical efficacy would soon dominate the nation against the
backdrop of the most significant infectious disease threat the modern world had
ever experienced.
II. CSC ON TRIAL: COVID-19
Debates over the underlying evidence and efficacy of CSC came to the
forefront as COVID-19, the deadliest disease in U.S. history, enveloped the
country in early 2020.100 Despite a decade of disaster planning and
preparedness,101 repeated patient surges over months during the COVID-19
pandemic tested CSC efforts among health care providers. Hospitals struggled to
garner essential resources to handle millions of COVID-19 patients,102 not all of
whom could receive maximum levels of care. Repeated shifts to CSC arose.
Extensive emergency powers authorized during the pandemic facilitated these
efforts (as the IOM Committee predicted in 2009),103 but not without generating
conflicts amid fluctuating legal and political environments.
A. Unprecedented Public Health Impacts
The COVID-19 pandemic devastated U.S. public health and health care
systems.104 What started as a mysterious illness105 quickly emerged as a
disastrous virus106 with health effects for millions that included flu-like

99. NASEM CSC WORKSHOP, supra note 15, at 38–39, 44–46.
100. Amy Mckeever, COVID-19 Surpasses 1918 Flu as Deadliest Pandemic in U.S. History, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/covid-19-is-now-thedeadliest-pandemic-in-us-history.
101. See supra Part I.
102. Between August 2020 and November 2021, over 3.2 million Americans required hospitalization
due to COVID-19. COVID Data Tracker: New Hospital Admissions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://covid. cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions (last visited Nov. 12,
2021).
103. See supra Part I.B.
104. Anne Schuchat, What I learned in 33 Years at the C.D.C., N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/06/10/opinion/anne-schuchat-cdc-retirement.html (“The Covid-19 pandemic
has been as large a disrupter as a world war, and its effect on life expectancy exceeds any threat we faced
since the last ‘great’ pandemic of 1918.”).
105. David Cyranoski, New Virus Identified as Likely Cause of Mystery Illness in China, NATURE
(Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00020-9.
106. See WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11,
2020) (transcript available on WHO website), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-
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symptoms, loss of taste or smell,107 lethargy, “brain fog,” lung damage, and
respiratory failure.108
As of January 5, 2022, the spread of COVID-19 led to over 57.1 million
confirmed cases109 and killed over 830,000 persons in the U.S.110 Unconfirmed
infections and deaths are likely far higher.111 Survivors occasionally suffered
long-term effects such as chronic fatigue, organ damage, heart complications,
and clotting diseases.112 While the impacts of COVID-19 disproportionately
affected older individuals,113 deaths occurred in all age groups.114 Over 5,900
U.S. children contracted multisystem inflammatory syndrome, a life-threatening
illness tied to COVID-19 infections;115 hundreds died.116 Despite the
director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 (indicating that
WHO was “deeply concerned . . . by the alarming levels of spread and severity” and that COVID-19 could
officially be characterized as a pandemic).
107. Symptoms of COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 22, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/ coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html.
108. Panagis Galiatsatos, COVID-19 Lung Damage, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/what-coronavirus-doesto-the-lungs (“COVID-19 can cause lung complications such as pneumonia and, in the most severe cases,
acute respiratory distress syndrome, or ARDS.”).
109. COVID-19 Dashboard, supra note 19.
110. Id.
111. Mary Van Beusekom, Study: US COVID Cases, Deaths Far Higher Than Reported, UNIV. OF
MINN. CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RSCH. & POL’Y (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/newsperspective/2021/01/study-us-covid-cases-deaths-far-higher-reported (“An estimated 14.3% of the US
population had antibodies against COVID-19 by mid-November 2020, suggesting that that the virus has
infected vastly more people than reported . . . .”); A study of COVID-19 cases through November 15,
2020, estimated that nearly 35% of COVID-19 deaths were unreported. Id. Furthermore, antibody analysis
of blood samples collected between March and May 2020 suggested that COVID-19 infection case
numbers were likely 6–24 times higher than reported case numbers. Fiona P. Havers et al., Seroprevalence
of Antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 in Six Sites in the United States, March 23-May 3, 2020, 180 JAMA 1576,
1579 (2020).
112. COVID-19 (Coronavirus): Long-Term Effects, MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 22, 2021),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/in-depth/coronavirus-long-term-effects/art20490351#:~:text=In%20some%20people%2C%20lasting%20health,they%20have%20had%20COVID
%2D19%20.
113. As of December 29, 2021, almost 75% of all COVID-19 deaths occurred in the 65-and-over age
group. COVID-19 Mortality Overview: Death by Age Group, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/covid19/mortality-overview.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2022).
114. See COVID 19 Death Data and Resources: Weekly Updates by Select Demographic and
Geographic Characteristics: Sex and Age, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid_weekly/index.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) (reflecting
number of deaths occurring in all age groups, from ages 0-17 to 85 and older).
115. Health Department-Reported Cases of Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome in Children (MISC) in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#mis-national-surveillance (last visited Jan. 5, 2022).
116. As of February 9, 2022, 296 children under 4 years old, and over 640 between ages 5 and 18,
have died from COVID-19. Deaths by Sex, Ages 0-18 Years, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://data.cdc.gov/ NCHS/Deaths-by-Sex-Ages-0-18-years/xa4b-4pzv (last visited Feb. 9,
2022). See also Apoorva Mandavilli, How Often Do Covid Vaccines Cause Heart Problems in Kids?,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2021/11/01/health/covid-kids-children.html
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development and extensive distribution of safe, free, and efficacious COVID-19
vaccines starting in December 2020,117 millions of unvaccinated individuals
continued to be at significant risk into 2022.118 Viral mutations lent to increasing
frequency of breakthrough infections among vaccinated individuals, particularly
those experiencing waning vaccine immunity.119
COVID-19 was the third leading cause of death in the U.S. in 2020, just
behind annual causes like heart disease and cancer for which mortality may
follow only after years of symptoms and treatments.120 In contrast, COVID-19
can kill victims rapidly, often within two to eight weeks of symptom onset.121
The highest number of deaths ever recorded in the U.S. occurred in 2020,122
reflecting profound health inequities in certain communities. As illustrated in
Table 3, COVID-19-related hospitalizations and death rates among Black,
Latino, and Indigenous populations were more than double the rates found in
White populations (as of March 2021).123

(“Since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, tens of thousands of children have been hospitalized with
Covid, and 657 have died, according to data collected by the C.D.C.”).
117. See FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID-19 By Issuing Emergency Use Authorization
for First COVID-19 Vaccine, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-useauthorization-first-covid-19#:~:text=Today%2%20C%20the%20U.S.%20Food%20and,years%20of
%20age%20and%20older (documenting FDA’s first emergency use authorization of a COVID-19
vaccine); FDA Approves First COVID-19 Vaccine, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-covid-19-vaccine
(documenting FDA’s first full approval of a COVID-19 vaccine).
118. Lindsay Kalter & Ralph Ellis, CDC: COVID-19 is a ‘Pandemic of the Unvaccinated’, WEBMD
(July 16, 2021), https://www.webmd.com/lung/news/20210716/delta-variant-rising-covid-case-countsevery-state. Between January 2021 through January 2022, over 420,000 COVID-19 deaths occurred
despite vaccine distribution. Trends in Number of COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in the US Reported to
CDC, by State/Territory, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#trends_totaldeaths_totaldeathsper100k|select (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) [hereinafter CDC, Trends
in Number of COVID-19 Cases and Deaths].
119. Aliza Aufrichtig & Amy Schoenfeld Walker, Who Had Covid-19 Vaccine Breakthrough Cases?,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/10/28/us/covid-breakthroughcases.html; Eleanor Cummins, Most Covid Infections May Soon Be Breakthroughs. Here’s What That
Means., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/19/opinion/omicron-break
throughs.html.
120. Farida B. Ahmad et al., Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Provisional Mortality Data – U.S., 2020,
70 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 519, 519–20 (2021).
121. WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT OF THE WHO-CHINA JOINT MISSION ON CORONAVIRUS DISEASE
2019 (COVID-19) 14 (2020).
122. Mike Stobbe, US Deaths in 2020 Top 3 Million, By Far Most Ever Counted, APNEWS (Dec. 22,
2020), https://apnews.com/article/us-coronavirus-deaths-top-3-million-e2bc856b6ec45563b84 ee2e87ae
8d5e7.
123. Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death by Race/Ethnicity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/
investigations-discovery/hospitalization-death-by-race-ethnicity.html.
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Table 3. U.S. Risks of COVID-19 By Race/Ethnicity124
Rate Ratios
Compared to
White Persons

American
Indian, Alaska
Native, or NonHispanic Persons

Black or
African
American, NonHispanic
Persons

Hispanic or
Latino
Persons

Cases

1.7x

1.1x

1.9x

Hospitalizations

3.5x

2.8x

2.8x

Deaths

2.4x

2.0x

2.3x

Average U.S. life expectancy declined by one year in 2020 due mostly to
COVID-19,125 one of the largest plunges ever measured in the U.S.126 People of
color experienced even more catastrophic results over the same period.127 Life
expectancies among Black and Hispanic populations declined by 2.7 years and
1.9 years, respectively.128
Extended periods of social distancing during the pandemic negatively
affected the mental health of many Americans,129 especially HCWs.

124. Id.
125. Elizabeth Arias et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Provisional Life Expectancy
Estimates for January through June, 2020, NVSS: VITAL STAT. RAPID RELEASE, no. 10, Feb. 2021, at 1.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. In June 2020, 25% of U.S. adults aged 18–24 reported having suicidal thoughts. Ellen Yard et
al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Emergency Dep’t Visits for Suspected Suicide Attempts Among
Persons Aged 12–25 Years Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic—U.S., Jan. 2019–May 2021, 70
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 888, 888 (2021). 13% of adults reported starting or increasing
substance use. Mark É. Czeisler et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Mental Health, Substance
Use, and Suicidal Ideation During the COVID-19 Pandemic — U.S., June 24–30, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1049, 1051 (2020). Drug overdose deaths spiked significantly in 2020 with over
93,000 deaths nationally. Jesse C. Baumgartner & David C. Radley, The Drug Overdose Toll in 2020 and
Near-Term Actions for Addressing It, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 16, 2021),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2021/drug-overdose-toll-2020-and-near-term-actionsaddressing-it. In January 2021, 41% of adults had symptoms of anxiety or depressive disorder, a nearly
four-fold increase from 2019. Nirmita Panchal et al., The Implications of COVID-19 for Mental Health
and Substance Use, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.kff.org/ coronavirus-covid19/issue-brief/the-implications-of-covid-19-for-mental-health-and-substance-use/.
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Overworked,130 understaffed,131 and under-protected,132 they suffered extreme
burnout.133 Many providers considered retiring early134 or switching careers.135
Almost twenty percent of HCWs left their positions.136 Hundreds of public health
workers vacated their offices in part due to mental anguish and duress by vocal
opponents of their communal efforts.137
Indirect health effects of the pandemic on the U.S. public health system
defy measurement.138 To maximize the response to the pandemic, health care
130. See Sara Berg, Half of Health Workers Report Burnout Amid COVID-19, AM. MED. ASS’N (July
20, 2021), https:// www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/physician-health/half-health-workers-reportburnout-amid-covid-19 (noting that between May-October 2020, HCWs experienced work overload and
burnout due to the pandemic).
131. Sean McMinn & Selena Simmons-Duffin, 1,000 U.S. Hospitals Are ‘Critically’ Short on Staff —
And More Expect to Be Soon, NPR (Nov. 20, 2020, 7:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/11/20/937 152062/1-000-u-s-hospitals-are-short-on-staff-and-more-expect-to-be-soon.
132. See generally Thomas D. Kirsch & James G. Hodge, Jr., Health Care Workers Deserve Better
Protections from Coronavirus Disease 2019, 11 JAMA HEALTH F., Nov. 16, 2020, https://jamanetwork
.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2773228 (noting significant increases in HCW infections and a
lack of regulatory standards aimed at protecting employee health and safety in hospital settings).
133. See The Mental Health of Healthcare Workers in COVID-19, MENTAL HEALTH AM.,
https://mhanational.org/mental-health-healthcare-workers-covid-19 (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) (reporting
that between June–September 2020, “93% of health care workers were experiencing stress, 86% reported
experiencing anxiety, 77% reported frustration, 76% reported exhaustion and burnout, and 75% said they
were overwhelmed”); Yuki Noguchi, Health Workers Know What Good Care Is. Pandemic Burnout is
Getting in the Way, NPR (Oct. 2, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/10/02/
1039312524/health-workers-know-what-good-care-is-pandemic-burnout-is-getting-in-the-way (recalling
that burnout directly impacted patient care); COVID-19 Impact Assessment Survey — The First Year, AM.
NURSES ASS’N, https://www.nursingworld.org/practice-policy/work-environment/health-safety/disasterpreparedness/coronavirus/what-you-need-to-know/year-one-covid-19-impact-assessment-survey/ (last
visited Jan. 5, 2022) (finding 51% of 22,316 nurses surveyed from January 19–February 16, 2021 reported
feeling exhausted and 43% reported feeling overwhelmed within the previous two weeks).
134. Quick COVID-19 Primary Care Survey: Series 21 Fielded September 18-21, 2020, LARRY
GREEN CTR. & PRIMARY CARE COLLABORATIVE, Mar. 13, 2020, at 1, https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/5d7ff8184cf0e01e4566cb02/t/5f75da37bde1f0691fc28b0d/1601559097041/C19+Series+21+Natio
nal+Executive+Summary.pdf.
135. See ASHLEY KIRZINGER ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., KFF/THE WASHINGTON POST
FRONTLINE HEALTH CARE WORKERS 16 (2021), https://files.kff.org/attachment/Frontline% 20Health
%20Care%20Workers_Full%20Report_FINAL.pdf (finding that at least one third of HCWs considered
leaving the field due to COVID-19).
136. See Gabby Galvin, Nearly 1 in 5 Health Care Workers Have Quit Their Jobs During the
Pandemic, MORNING CONSULT (Oct. 4, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://morningconsult.com/2021/10/04/
health-care-workers-series-part-2-workforce/ (reporting that “18% of health care workers have quit their
jobs during the COVID-19 pandemic”); see also BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T. OF LAB., JOB
OPENINGS & LABOR TURNOVER—SEPT. 2021 (2021) (reporting that in August 2021, over half a million
health care workers in the U.S. quit their jobs).
137. See Brooke Torton & Kathleen Hoke, Public Health Under Threat: An Examination of State
Laws Protecting Public Health Officials from Harassment, NETWORK FOR PUB. HEALTH L. (June 24,
2021), https://www. networkforphl.org/resources/public-health-under-threat-an-examination-of-statelaws-protecting-public-health-officials-from-harassment/ (documenting HCWs experiencing hostility in
the workplace due to widespread opposition of pandemic response measures).
138. Kristina W. Kintziger et al., The Impact of the COVID-19 Response on the Provision of Other
Public Health Services in the U.S.: A Cross Sectional Study, 16 PLOS ONE, Oct. 14, 2021, at 1. In
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entities limited or eliminated many health functions.139 Hospitals redirected
health care staff working in areas such as chronic disease, substance abuse, and
maternal-child health to COVID-related duties.140 Focusing treatments on
COVID-19 patients meant that other essential public health services were
abandoned or temporarily abated.141 Reclaiming normalcy in the provision of
public health services nationally after the pandemic may take years.142
B. Scarce Resources and Patient Surges
The COVID-19 pandemic deeply exposed existing vulnerabilities of U.S.
public health and health care systems. Hospitals experienced repeated deluges of
COVID-19 patients and scarcities of essential resources over multiple waves of
infections, as illustrated in Figure 3.143
Figure 3. U.S. Daily Confirmed Cases of COVID-19144

addition, widespread infections and uncertainty over use of organs from donors testing positive for
COVID-19 limited donations nationally. See Roni Caryn Rabin, She Died with Long Covid. Should Her
Organs Have Been Donated?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/07/health/
covid-organ-transplants.html (documenting how medical professionals debate “whether the organs of
people who survived Covid, and even of those who died with the illness, are really safe and healthy enough
to be transplanted”).
139. See Kintziger, et al., supra note 138, at 2.
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id. at 6–7.
142. See id. at 9 (“The burden of the COVID-19 response on those working in public health practice
is likely to impact the public health workforce, and by extension, public health, for years to come.”).
143. CDC, Trends in Number of COVID-19 Cases and Deaths, supra note 118.
144. Id.
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The national health system began to destabilize at the inception of the
pandemic in March 2020.145 Extensive numbers of patients presenting for
emergency care overwhelmed health care facilities in New York City and other
major metropolitan areas.146 Shortages of ventilators, beds, and space for the
deceased exacerbated the precarious effects of the virus.147 Lacking effective
pharmaceutical interventions early on in the pandemic, ventilator allocations
often dictated patient survival.148 Facing droves of patients, hospitals could not
maintain optimal staffing levels.149 They recruited staff from other parts of the
hospital or relied on outside paid HCWs or volunteers, many of whom were not
originally trained in critical care.150
As patient numbers swelled, HCWs and emergency responders faced a
massive shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) (e.g., gloves, masks,
goggles, face shields, gowns).151 By March 27, 2020, almost one-third of
hospitals depleted their supply of face masks,152 requiring reuses of expired N95
masks.153 On April 1, 2020, federal officials reported that resources in the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) strategic national stockpile of

145. Elliot Ramos & Nigel Chiwaya, ‘It Was Hell’: How Covid-19 Surges Played Out Season by
Season, NBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2021, 6:32 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/it-was-hell-how
-covid-19-surges-played-out-season-n1260446.
146. Id.
147. See Robert D. Truog et al., The Toughest Triage—Allocating Ventilators in a Pandemic, 382
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1973, 1973 (2020) (noting the US medical system will have to ration ventilators and
make “life-or-death” decisions like never before); Ramos & Chiwaya, supra note 145 (reporting that
healthcare facilities were overwhelmed by shortages of tests, PPE, ventilators, beds, and space for the
dead).
148. See Truog et al., supra note 147, at 1974 (“When patients’ breathing deteriorates to the point that
they need a ventilator, there is typically only a limited window during which they can be saved.”).
149. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM SERVS., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES
RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PULSE SURVEY MARCH 23–27,
2020, at 4 (2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-00300.pdf.
150. See id. at 10, 12 (noting a shortage of specialized providers needed to respond to the pandemic,
such as respiratory therapists and intensivists).
151. Jennifer Cohen & Yana van der Meulen Rodgers, Contributing Factors to Personal Protective
Equipment Shortages During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 141 PREVENTIVE MED., Oct. 2, 2020, at 1, 2. Staff
compared their available PPE supply to soldiers going into combat with cardboard body armor. Id.
“Without adequate PPE, health care workers [would] get sick, endangering the functioning of the entire
health care system.” Megan L. Ranney et al., Critical Supply Shortages—The Need for Ventilators and
Personal Protective Equipment During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED., Apr. 30, 2020,
at 1.
152. Douglas Kamerow, Covid-19: The Crisis of Personal Protective Equipment in the US, BRIT.
MED. J., Apr. 3, 2020, at 1; see Umesh N. Khot, Navigating Healthcare Supply Shortages During the
COVID-19 Pandemic: A Cardiologist’s Perspective, 13 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR QUALITY &
OUTCOMES 280, 281 (2020) (indicating that the country needed around 300 million N95 respirator masks
per month, but U.S. manufacturers were only initially producing 35 million).
153. Cohen & van der Meulen Rodgers, supra note 151, at 2.
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PPE were “nearly gone.”154 States were left to bid against each other (and the
federal government) for PPE in a global marketplace already deluged with
international orders.155 Several jurisdictions limited elective medical procedures
to preserve PPE for COVID-19 patients.156
With supplies scarce, some states activated their CSC plans during the
summer of 2020 to give hospitals greater flexibility in allocating resources and
determining patient outcomes. Not all hospitals complied. In Arizona, some
Phoenix-based hospitals avoided implementing internal CSC plans after the state
invoked its plan on June 29, 2020.157 Elsewhere, hospitals activated or generated
their own policies for triaging patients based on qualifiers such as benefit, age,
conservation of resources, or lottery-based mechanisms.158
Premature societal re-openings, a massively contentious political
environment, and increased travel and social gatherings around end-of-the-year
holidays in 2020 fueled additional COVID-19 infections.159 As new records for
numbers of COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths arose,160 destructive,
long-term effects on patient care emerged. In California, rising illnesses and
fatigue among HCWs further depleted staff161 as hospitals overrode limits on

154. Nick Miroff, Protective Gear in National Stockpile is Nearly Depleted, DHS Officials Say,
WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/coronavirus-protective-gearstockpile-depleted/2020/04/01/ 44d6592a-741f-11ea-ae50-7148009252e3_story.html.
155. Andrew Soergel, States Competing in ‘Global Jungle’ for PPE, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2020-04-07/states-compete-in-global-jungle-forpersonal-protective-equipment-amid-coronavirus N.Y. Gov.
156. See, e.g., Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-10 (Mar. 21, 2020) (suspending “all non-essential or
elective surgeries, including elective dental surgeries, that utilize personal protective equipment or
ventilators . . .”); TX. Exec. Order No. GA-27 (June 25, 2020) (suspending non-essential surgeries); N.M.
Exec. Order No. 2020-083 (Dec. 4, 2020) (ordering implementation of CSC); see generally Roy G. Spece,
Jr., COVID-19 Control: Disrupting Doctor-Patient Relationships, 100 NEB. L. REV. 150 (2021)
(documenting delays in routine health services necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic and concomitant
legal issues related to interferences with doctor-patient relationships).
157. Jeremy Duda, As COVID-19 Worsens, AZ Is the First State to Enact ‘Crisis Care’ Standards,
AZMIRROR (July 3, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.azmirror.com/2020/07/03/as-covid-19-worsens-az-isthe-first-state-to-enact-crisis-care-standards/.
158. Armand H. Matheny Antommaria et al., Ventilator Triage Policies During the COVID-19
Pandemic at U.S. Hospitals Associated with Members of the Association of Bioethics Program Directors,
173 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 188, 188–91 (2020).
159. AJMC Staff, A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020¸ AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE (Jan.
1, 2021), https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020; William H. Frey,
One Year In, COVID-19’s Uneven Spread Across the US Continues, BROOKINGS (Mar. 5, 2021)
https://www.brookings.edu/research/one-year-in-covid-19s-uneven-spread-across-the-us-continues/.
160. Peter Sullivan, Post-Holiday COVID-19 Surge Hits New Deadly Records, THE HILL (Jan. 14,
2021, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/534139-post-holiday-covid-surge-hits-newdeadly-records. On one day alone, over 4,300 people died of COVID-19 in the U.S. Id.
161. See Reed Abelson, Covid Overload: U.S. Hospitals Are Running Out of Beds for Patients, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/27/health/covid-hospitals-overload.html
(noting that infection rates among HCWs “doubled the patient load” on providers still able to work).
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staff workloads to assign more patients to each provider.162 Increasing numbers
of non-emergency physicians were shifted to frontline responses.163 Nurses cared
for more patients coextensively than typically recommended.164 Patients suffered
long waits165 or were triaged through expanded telehealth efforts166 as hospitals
struggled to locate beds and secure staff.167 In heavily impacted areas of the
country, 9-1-1 call response times lagged by two to three minutes, often the
difference between life and death for time-sensitive emergencies.168 Hospitals
diverted emergent patients to mitigate immense backlogs.169 Ambulance
transfers that previously took fifteen minutes on average extended into hours as
responders searched for hospitals with available space.170
In December 2020, New Mexico’s health department authorized hospitals
to operate under CSC, allowing HCWs to assist in areas outside their normal
scope of practice.171 In January 2021, California required its hospitals to develop
and publish crisis plans, including algorithms governing decisions about which
patients would receive life-saving resources such as ventilators.172 Capacity
limits became so dire that Los Angeles County instructed emergency responders

162. See, e.g., April Dembosky, California Is Overriding Its Limits on Nurse Workloads As COVID19 Surges, NPR (Dec. 30, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/
12/30/950177471/california-is-overriding-its-limits-on-nurse-workloads-as-covid-19-surges. Governor
Newsom temporarily lifted a California law restricting the nurse-to-patient ratio in hospitals to account
for COVID-19 patient surges. Id. As a result, over 170 California hospitals operated under new ratios:
ICU nurses could care for three patients instead of two, emergency room nurses could care for six patients
instead of four, and medical-surgical nurses could care for seven patients instead of five. Id.
163. See Abelson, supra note 161 (documenting that hospitals enlisted primary care and family doctors
to treat COVID-19 patients).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. JAMES G. HODGE, JR. ET AL., WESTERN REGION ALLIANCE PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY MEDICINE
LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE 22–25 (2021) [hereinafter HODGE, JR., WESTERN REGION ALLIANCE].
167. Abelson, supra note 161.
168. Holly Yan, If You Call 911, It Can Take 2-3 Minutes Longer to Get Help Now, CNN (Jan. 24,
2021, 10:29 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/22/health/covid-19-triage-emergency-care/index.html.
169. See, e.g., Alison Steinbach, Stressed Phoenix Hospitals Close Doors to Ambulances, Divert
Patients to Other Facilities, AZCENT. (Dec. 29, 2020, 6:25 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/
news/local/arizona-health/2020/12/29/phoenix-hospitals-close-doors-ambulances-divert-patients-otherfacilities/4079832001/. In December 2020, several Phoenix hospitals closed their emergency rooms to
new patients because they were beyond capacity. Id.
170. Yan, supra note 168 (denoting how some paramedic services had to transfer patients to out-ofstate hospitals located hundreds of miles away).
171. DOH Issues Public Health Orders Temporarily Limiting Non-Essential Surgeries, Recognizing
Activation of Crisis Care, NEWMEXICO.GOV (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.newmexico.gov/2020/12/10/
doh-issues-public-health-orders-temporarily-limiting-non-essential-surgeries-recognizing-activation-ofcrisis-care/; N.M. Exec. Order No. 2020-083 (Dec. 4, 2020).
172. Melanie Evans & Christine Mai-Duc, Covid-19 Crisis Forces California Hospitals to Plan Who
Gets Life-Saving Care, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2021, 9:24 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19crisis-forces-california-hospitals-to-plan-who-gets-life-saving-care-11610115894.
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not to take cardiac patients to the hospital if they could not be resuscitated with
CPR.173
The rise of the highly contagious Delta variant over the summer of 2021
staggered dozens of hospitals, especially in states with low vaccination rates.174
High-flow oxygen, effective in treating many COVID-19 patients, became
scarce.175 Simultaneously, hospitals ran out of space in their ICUs.176 By
September 2021, one-quarter of hospitals in multiple southern states reported
that more than 95 percent of their beds were occupied.177 Some hospitals were
forced to place patients in hallways and conference rooms or merge their ICUs.178
Shortages of monoclonal antibody treatments led HHS to commandeer and
control national distributions against rising patient counts.179
Idaho180 and Alaska181 formally activated their states’ CSC plans in
September 2021, seeking outside assistance from HCWs around the country.182
Hospitals in Montana instituted CSC as cases spiked and vaccination rates

173. Email from Marianne Gausche-Hill, Med. Dir., EMS Agency, L.A. Cnty., to Distribution (Jan.
4, 2021), https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/dhs/1100458_Directive_6revTransportofTraumaticandNon
traumaticCardiacArrest.pdf (on file with L.A. County).
174. See Kathy Katella, 5 Things to Know About the Delta Variant, YALE MED., https://www.
yalemedicine.org/news/5-things-to-know-delta-variant-covid (Mar. 1, 2022) (highlighting that the Delta
variant caused the most severe damage in places with low vaccination rates).
175. See Maia Anderson, 4 Updates on the US Medical Oxygen Supply, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Sept.
1, 2021), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/supply-chain/4-updates-on-the-us-medical-oxygensupply.html (stating that hospitals in Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Texas all struggled with low
oxygen supplies); The Latest Pandemic Shortage: Oxygen, ADVISORY BD. (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.
advisory.com/daily-briefing/2021/09/ 01/oxygen-shortage (showing that some hospitals reported having
“less than a day’s supply of oxygen available for patients”).
176. Smart, supra note 20.
177. Id. In Alabama, no ICU beds were available on many days of September 2021. Id.
178. Madeline Holocombe, These 5 States Have Less Than 10% of ICU Beds Left As Covid-19
Overwhelms Hospitals, CNN (Sept. 1, 2021, 3:46 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/31/health/uscoronavirus-tuesday/index.html.
179. See Lenny Bernstein, Biden Administration Moves to Stave Off Shortages of Monoclonal
Antibodies, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2021, 6:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/09/
14/monoclonal-antibodies-shortage/ (explaining that the Biden administration took over distribution of
monoclonal antibodies and HHS announced that it would determine how many doses would be distributed
to each state and territory on a weekly basis).
180. Idaho Activates Crisis Standards of Care in North Idaho Due to of Surge in COVID-19 Patients
Requiring Hospitalization, IDAHO DEP’T OF HEALTH & WELFARE (Sept. 7, 2021), https://healthand
welfare.idaho.gov/news/idaho-activates-crisis-standards-care-north-idaho-due-surge-covid-19-patientsrequiring [hereinafter Idaho Activates Crisis Standards].
181. Addendum No. 1 Covid-19 Emergency Order, ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., (Sept.
21,
2021),
https://gov.alaska.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/COVID-19-PUBLIC-HEALTHEMERGENCY-ADDENDUM-NO-1-Final.pdf.
182. Mike Baker, In Alaska’s Covid Crisis, Doctors Must Decide Who Lives and Who Dies, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/us/coronavirus-crisis-alaska.html. (“With
emergency rooms overwhelmed, [Alaska’s] governor has asked hundreds of medical workers to fly in
from around the country to help.”).
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remained low.183 For the second time, New Mexico re-activated its CSC plans
on October 18, 2021, in part to handle excessive numbers of patients seeking
non-COVID-19 care whose medical procedures were set aside during the
pandemic.184 Cases rose again nationally in the last quarter of 2021 due to the
emergence of the highly contagious Omicron variant.185 On January 4, 2022,
Maryland Governor Larry Hogan declared a 30-day state of emergency and
catastrophic health emergency, expressly acknowledging the strain on resources
demonstrated by certain hospitals “implement[ing] crisis standards of care.”186
Through multiple waves of patient surges and insufficient or ill-matched
resources, hospitals often resorted to hastily developed protocols for triage,
admission, treatment, and resource allocation.187 Increased risk of patient
mortality was strongly associated with inherent limitations in handling surges
across the U.S.188 While final assessments of the impacts of the pandemic on
hospital performance are still underway, between March and August 2020,
strains on hospitals may have contributed to nearly one-quarter of COVID-19
deaths.189
C. Dynamic Legal Environment
The magnitude and duration of the COVID-19 pandemic led to
unprecedented governmental responses, political turmoil across two Presidential
administrations, and substantial legal challenges. The most extensive use of
emergency powers ever undertaken by federal, state, and local governments
greatly facilitated CSC efforts during the pandemic. Resulting legal disputes and
183. Justin Franz, Montana Hospitals in ‘Dire’ Straits as COVID Rages, MONT. FREE PRESS (Sept.
17, 2021), https://montanafreepress.org/2021/09/17/montana-hospitals-enter-crisis-care/; Gabrielle
Masson, Montana Hospital Enacts Crisis Standards of Care; State Updates Guidance for Hospitals,
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Sept. 17, 2021), https:// www.beckershospitalreview.com/patient-flow/montanahospital-enacts-crisis-standards-of-care-state-updates-guidance-for-hospitals.html.
184. Daniel J. Chacón, New Mexico Enacts Crisis Standards of Care, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Oct.
18, 2021), https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/new-mexico-enacts-crisis-standardsof-care/article_1f28a832-305b-11ec-a10a-2f8d145f4b5c.html.
185. Alyssa Lukpat & Sarah Calahan, The U.S. Breaks its Single-Day Case Record, Nearly Doubling
the Highest Numbers from Last Winter, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
live/2021/12/29/world/omicron-covid-vaccine-tests/the-us-breaks-its-single-day-case-record-nearlydoubling-the-highest-numbers-from-last-winter (“The rise [in cases] has been driven by the highly
contagious Omicron variant, which became dominant in the United States as of last week.”).
186. MD. OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF MARYLAND PROCLAMATION: DECLARATION OF STATE
OF EMERGENCY AND EXISTENCE OF CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EMERGENCY—COVID-19 (2022),
https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Proclamation-Jan-4-2022-correcteddate.pdf.
187. Vineet Chopra, When COVID-19 Strikes Your Hospital, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 1319, 1319
(2021).
188. See Sameer S. Kadri et al., Association Between Caseload Surge and COVID-19 Survival in 558
U.S. Hospitals, March to August 2020, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED., Jul. 6, 2021, at 1 (summarizing
statistics from hospitals nationally showing increases in mortality correlating with surges of COVID-19).
189. Id.
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policy pushbacks, however, diminished governmental emergency authorities.
Conflicts and uncertainties regarding emergency legal powers often left hospitals
and HCWs at a loss for critical guidance.
A litany of emergency declarations arose during the pandemic. On January
31, 2020, HHS Secretary Alex Azar declared a national PHE.190 As cases
escalated in the ensuing weeks, President Trump declared dual emergencies
under the Stafford Act191 and the National Emergencies Act192 on March 13,
2020, to further mobilize essential public health responses.193 By the end of
March 2020, every state and multiple territories had also declared their own
emergency, disaster, or PHE—a first in U.S. history, as seen in Figure 4.194

190. Press Release, Alex Azar II, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Determination that a Public
Health Emergency Exists (Jan. 31, 2020) (on file with U.S. HHS). This emergency declaration has since
been renewed on seven consecutive occasions. See Public Health Emergency Declarations, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/
healthactions/phe/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) (cataloguing seven renewals of the
COVID-19 national PHE as issued initially on January 31, 2020 and renewed on April 21, 2020, July 23,
2020, October 2, 2020, January 7, 2021, April 15, 2021, July 19, 2021, and October 15, 2021).
191. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.
192. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
193. Letter from President Donald J. Trump, to Sec’y Wolf, Sec’y Mnuchin, Sec’y Azar, & Adm’r
Gaynor (Mar. 13, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/letter-presidentdonald-j-trump-emergency-determination-stafford-act/.
194. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., COVID’s Constitutional Conundrum: Assessing Individual Rights in
Public Health Emergencies, 88 TENN. L. REV. 837, 848–849 (2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3802045.
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Figure 4. State/Territorial Emergency Declarations Regarding COVID-19195

Collectively, these declarations fundamentally altered the legal landscape
by authorizing: (1) sweeping social distancing measures (e.g., quarantine,
isolation, shelter-in-place); (2) routine HCW licensing protocols and health care
regulations; (3) expanded scopes of practice; (4) real-time acquisition,
development, and allocation of extensive medical and other resources; and (5)
shifts to CSC.196
As the IOM Committee foretold in 2009, implementation of CSC raised
extensive concerns about professional and institutional liability.197 HHS
Secretary Azar issued a declaration under the Public Readiness and Emergency
195. James G. Hodge, Jr., Covid-19 Emergency Legal Preparedness Primer 13, NETWORK FOR PUB.
HEALTH L., Feb. 1, 2021, at 3, https://www.networkforphl.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/WesternRegion-Primer-COVID-2-1-2021.pdf.
196. See HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 68, at 413–20; see also Hannah Knowles, Hospitals
Overwhelmed by Covid Are Turning to ‘Crisis Standards of Care.’ What Does That Mean?, WASH. POST
(Sept. 22, 2021, 11:02 PM), https://www. washingtonpost.com/health/2021/09/22/crisis-standards-ofcare/ (describing activated statewide CSC to “prioritize patients for scarce resources” in hospital settings).
197. Tanya Albert Henry, Why Physicians Need COVID-19-Related Medical Liability Protections,
AM. MED. ASS’N (June 15, 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/sustainability/whyphysicians-need-covid-19-related-medical-liability (“Without legislative protection, physicians and other
health care professionals face the threat of years of costly litigation tied to the extraordinary circumstances
under which they are providing care to patients during the COVID-19 pandemic.”); Letter from Am. Med.
Ass’n et al., to Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives et al. (June 9, 2020),
https://searchlf.ama-assn.org/undefined/documentDownload?uri=%2Funstructured%2Fbinary%2Fletter
%2FLETTERS%2FFederation-Sign-on-Letter-Liability-Protections-6-9-20.pdf (urging Congress to
include health care provider liability protections in the then-forthcoming COVID-19 relief package).
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Preparedness (PREP) Act (which took effect retroactively on February 4,
2020),198 in part to protect health care providers and others against negligence
claims arising from the use of authorized medical countermeasures (MCMs)
(e.g., antiviral medications, biologics, vaccines, diagnostics, and/or devices).199
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, signed by
President Trump on March 27, 2020, specifically insulated volunteer HCWs
from liability.200 On March 24, 2020, HHS urged state governors to take their
own steps to shield HCWs from medical liability.201 Several states complied via
legislation, executive orders, or other measures, often tied to their emergency
declarations.202
Political turmoil and federalism debates erupted as the virus gripped the
nation. Misinformation along party lines led to divisive political views over
preferred policies during the public health crisis.203 “Elevated friction” between

198. Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical
Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,198 (Mar. 17, 2020). Multiple amendments to the
original declaration were made throughout the pandemic. See, e.g., Declaration Under the Public
Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19;
Correction, 86 Fed. Reg. 54,696 (Oct. 4, 2021).
199. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://aspr.hhs.gov/legal/PREPact/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2022); Declaration Under the
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85
Fed. Reg. 15,198, 15,202.
200. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 3215, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 9001 et
seq.). Throughout the declared federal PHE, health care professionals who provide volunteer medical
services related to COVID-19 are not liable unless their activity amounts to gross negligence or egregious
conduct. Id. CARES Act protections preempt inconsistent state and local laws. Liability Protections for
Health Care Professionals During COVID-19, AM. MED. ASS’N (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.amaassn.org/practice-management/sustainability/liability-protections-health-care-professionals-duringcovid-19. The protections only apply to volunteer medical services relating to COVID-19 and would not
cover HCWs providing other medical care, even if such care was impacted by the pandemic via staffing
and resource shortages. Id.
201. Letter from Alex Azar, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., to Governors (Mar. 24, 2020)
(on file with U.S. HHS), https://www.ncsbn.org/HHS_Secretary_Letter_to_States_Licensing_ Waivers.
pdf. In addition to seeking increased liability protections, Secretary Azar also asked states to allow
interstate practice, relax scope of practice requirements, expand telehealth, and increase authority of
medical students. Id.
202. For example, Arizona enacted legislation protecting health care providers responding to the PHE
from ordinary negligence. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-516(E) (2021) (“This section applies to all claims
that are filed before or after September 29, 2021, for an act or omission by a person that occurred on or
after March 11, 2020, and that relates to a public health pandemic that is the subject of the state of
emergency declared by the governor.”) (emphasis added). More than half of the states enacted liability
protections for long-term care facilities. Samuel Brooks et al., States Move to Shield LTC Facilities from
Civil Liability, AM. BAR ASS’N (July 22, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_aging/
publications/bifocal/vol-41/vol-41—issue-no-6—july-august-2020-/states-move-to-shield-ltc-facilitiesfrom-liability.
203. Liz Hamel et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll - September 2020: Top Issues in 2020 Election, The
Role of Misinformation, and Views on A Potential Coronavirus Vaccine, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 10,
2020),
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/report/kff-health-tracking-poll-september-2020/.
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federal, state, and local governments over who specifically was in control
resulted in a patchwork of pandemic response efforts.204 With drastically
different legal approaches across states and a paucity of federal guidance early
in the pandemic, waves of infection arising in distinct areas of the country fueled
outbreaks elsewhere.205
State legislative challenges and select judicial invalidations of PHE powers
altered response capabilities midstream in specific jurisdictions.206 After the
Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidated the authority of the state’s secretary of
health to issue stay-home orders on May 13, 2020,207 COVID-19 cases
escalated.208 When Arizona Governor Doug Ducey lifted his stay-at-home order
on May 15, 2020, daily cases increased by 151% over the following weeks.209
Infections exploded in Florida in July of 2020 as Governor Ron DeSantis resisted
calls for mask mandates.210 Local government dissension arose to countervailing
state approaches. Some larger municipalities challenged state Governors and
legislatures head-on over policies and laws lacking efficacy, rejecting
epidemiologic evidence, and shelving proven public health interventions.211
As the pandemic continued into its second year, the role of the federal
government amplified under President Biden’s “wartime” stance to the

Almost half of adults held at least one misconception about COVID-19 leading up to the 2020 election.
Id.
204. See Nancy J. Knauer, The COVID-19 Pandemic and Federalism: Who Decides?, 23 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2020) (examining the role of federalism in the early days of the pandemic
throughout the U.S.).
205. Ramos & Chiwaya, supra note 145.
206. See, e.g., James G. Hodge, Jr., National Legal Paradigms for Public Health Emergency
Responses, 71 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 76–77 (2021) (noting varied legislative and judicial responses to social
distancing measures).
207. Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.3d 900, 905 (Wis. 2020).
208. Sarah Hauer et al., Wisconsin Communities Going Without Coronavirus Restrictions as Cases
Continue to Rise, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 16, 2020, 2:16 AM), https://www.jsonline.com/story/
news/2020/05/15/wisconsin-communities-lift-coronavirus-orders-cases-increase/5203111002/.
209. M. Shayne Gallaway et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Trends in COVID-19
Incidence After Implementation of Mitigation Measures — Arizona, January 22–August 7, 2020, 69
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1460, 1460 (2020) (“The average number of daily cases increased
approximately 151%, from 808 on June 1, 2020 to 2,026 on June 15, 2020 . . .”).
210. Ramos & Chiwaya, supra note 145.
211. See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, As COVID-19 Proliferates Mayors Take Response Lead, Sometimes
in Conflicts with Their Governors, GEORGETOWN L., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/salpal/as-covid19-proliferates-mayors-take-response-lead-sometimes-in-conflicts-with-their-governors/ (last visited
Nov. 12, 2021) (detailing mayors and health officials responding to the pandemic while conflicting with
governors who have primary authority in public health emergencies); Elaine S. Povich, Pandemic
Provokes City vs. State Conflicts, PEW TRS. (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2021/04/14/pandemic-provokes-city-vs-state-conflicts (“The pandemic provoked
conflicts between state and local governments—particularly in cities run by Democrats and states
controlled by Republicans—when it came to COVID-19 rules such as mask ordinances and regulations
on when businesses could open and at what capacity.”).
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pandemic.212 His administration’s aggressive approach was ensconced in a
seven-point COVID-19 game plan and punctuated by a national vaccination
campaign and extensive federal mandates,213 intended to preempt contrary state
laws and policies.214 Many states welcomed the enhanced public health
measures, but others resisted through a series of COVID-19 denialistic laws and
policies.215 Governors in select jurisdictions (e.g., AZ, FL, TX) banned mask
mandates, vaccine requirements, and vaccine passports.216 Legislatures in some
states introduced manifold bills to limit current or future exercises of public
health powers, although many of these measures did not pass or were vetoed.217
With a temporary lull in infections experienced in late spring 2021, multiple
states rescinded their emergency declarations even as the highly contagious Delta
variant emerged.218 Mass spread of the variant led to the third largest wave of
infections throughout the pandemic, requiring several states to re-issue their
emergency declarations and orders by early fall 2021.219 The Omicron variant—
emerging late in 2021—caused U.S. case numbers to spike in January 2022 to
the highest peak seen throughout the pandemic.220
Legal variances and political clashes across all levels of government
reflected fragmented approaches and repeated cycles of authorizing and

212. PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE COVID-19 RESPONSE &
PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS 24–28 (2021).
213. See id. (explaining that the Biden Administration’s national strategy for the COVID-19 response
sets forth concrete steps for fighting the virus through six domestic strategic goals and one overarching
global health goal, as well as the establishment of a federal office responsible for coordinating the
pandemic response across all federal departments and agencies).
214. Hodge, Jr., Legal Interventions, supra note 24, at 678; James G. Hodge, Jr. & Jennifer L. Piatt,
COVID’s Counterpunch: State Legislative Assaults on Public Health Emergency Powers, 36 B.Y.U. J.
PUB. L. 31, 43–44, 50 (2022) [hereinafter Hodge, Jr. & Piatt, COVID’s Counterpunch].
215. Hodge, Jr., Legal Interventions, supra note 24, at 677–78; Jill Krueger, Proposed Limits on
Public Health Authority: Dangerous for Public Health, NETWORK FOR PUB. HEALTH L. (June 8, 2021),
https://www.networkforphl.org/resources/proposed-limits-on-public-health-authority-dangerous-forpublic-health-2/.
216. Hodge, Jr., Legal Interventions, supra note 24, at 678.
217. See Hodge, Jr. & Piatt, COVID’s Counterpunch, supra note 214, at 34 (documenting that as of
April 30, 2021, states introduced over 300 bills or resolutions aimed to limit emergency powers).
218. See Email from Lauren Dedon, Nat’l Governors Ass’n, to James G. Hodge, Jr, Jennifer L. Piatt,
& Rebecca Freed (Dec. 16, 2021) (on file with author) (stating in a spreadsheet document that as of
December 16, 2021, 25 states had rescinded their emergency declarations).
219. State Emergency Health Orders During the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, 2021,
BALLOTPEDIA (Jan. 3, 2022), https://ballotpedia.org/State_emergency_health_orders_during_the_
coronavirus_(COVID-19)_ pandemic, _2021. For example, Maryland Governor Hogan reinstated the
statewide COVID-19 PHE on July 12, 2021. MD. GOV. LAWRENCE J. HOGAN, JR., RENEWAL OF
DECLARATION OF STATE OF EMERGENCY AND EXISTENCE OF CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EMERGENCY —
COVID-19 (2021), https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2021/07/2698_001.pdf. Arkansas
Governor Asa Hutchinson did the same on July 29, 2021. Ark. Exec. Order No. EO 21-14 (July 29, 2021).
On November 26, 2021, New York Governor Kathy Hochul declared a state of emergency in response to
the Omicron variant. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 11 (Nov. 26, 2021).
220. CDC, Trends in Number of COVID-19 Cases and Deaths, supra note 118.
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invalidating public health powers. HCWs and entities, exhausted by continuous
months of patient surges and limited resources, sought clarity in guidance to
effectuate CSC where needed. Reaching such accord in the extant legal
environment was a defining challenge of the entire COVID-19 pandemic.
III.ASSESSING AND RESOLVING LEGAL CHALLENGES UNDERLYING CSC
The need for clear and consistent legal pathways to ensure efficient and
equitable execution of CSC is a pervasive lesson from the COVID-19 pandemic.
From its inception, a plethora of distinct legal issues arose surrounding CSC,
including documentation and reimbursement issues,221 privacy-related
concerns,222 waivers of existing legal requirements,223 informed consent
alterations,224 liability risks,225 and alleviating staff shortages.226 As the IOM
Committee forecasted in 2009,227 these types of issues could be addressed
through emergency declaratory powers, executive orders, and real-time agency
guidance.
Other law and policy issues, however, present significantly greater
challenges to CSC’s implementation, warranting explicit solutions. First, CSC
cannot be operationalized effectively without clearer understandings of its legal
triggers. Second, implementation of CSC necessitates regional coordination
across public and private sectors to promote uniformity, but such coordination
within and across states was often haphazard or foregone. Third, macroallocations underlying CSC exposed unlawful, discriminatory impacts among
certain populations. Finally, “tie-breaking” decisions concerning individual
patient access to critical scarce resources (e.g., ventilators, ICUs) demanded
resolution of thorny legal issues to avoid inequities in treatment and services.228

221. Piatt & Hodge, Jr., Crisis Standards of Care, supra note 29, at 4.
222. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & L. & N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, VENTILATOR
ALLOCATION GUIDELINES 210–11 (2015).
223. 1135 Waiver, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY (May 13, 2021), https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/
legal/Pages/1135-waivers.aspx.
224. George J. Annas & Sondra S. Crosby, Standard Racism: Trying to Use “Crisis Standards of
Care” in the COVID-19 Pandemic, 21 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1–2 (2021).
225. Donna Levin et al., FAQ: Crisis Standards of Care and Health Provider Liability, NETWORK FOR
PUB. HEALTH L. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.networkforphl.org/resources/faqs-crisis-standards-of-careand-health-provider-liability/.
226. Scott Aronson et al., Healthcare Provider Shortages: Resources and Strategies for Meeting
Demand, ASPR TRACIE, Nov. 2021, at 1, https://files.asprtracie.hhs.gov/documents/healthcare-work
force-strategies-for-managing-a-surge-in-healthcare-provider-demand.pdf (“Staff shortages have been a
primary challenge in the management of patient surge during the COVID-19 pandemic and other
disasters.”).
227. See supra Part I.B., Table 1.
228. CLARE STROUD ET AL., INST. OF MED., CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE: SUMMARY OF A
WORKSHOP SERIES 62 (2010).
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As explicated below, the future of CSC hinges on resolving these legal
conundrums.
A. Reconsidering Legal Triggers
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, repeated patient surges and fleeting
resources amid changing legal dynamics obfuscated clear triggers for CSC
implementation. HCWs, hospitalists, and public health personnel persistently
asked, “have we shifted into CSC or not?” Lacking clear answers, HCWs were
tepid in their emergency responses. A palpable need for clarity over legal triggers
arose.
In its initial Letter Report, the IOM Committee expressly advocated that
shifts to CSC would be “formally declared by a state government, in recognition
that crisis operations will be in effect for a sustained period.”229 COVID-19
clearly warranted extended emergency responses at all levels of government.230
Yet not every emergency declaration also necessitated CSC.231 During the
pandemic, some hospital systems managed patient surges reasonably well to
stave off crisis.232 Express invocations of state-level CSC plans emerged in only
a select number of states (including Alaska,233 Arizona,234 Idaho,235 New
Hampshire,236 and New Mexico237).
Other states did not follow suit in part because they lacked express CSC
plans, were politically reticent,238 or deferred to health care facility efforts.239

229. IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 18; see supra Part I.A.
230. See supra Part II.C.
231. See Hick et al., supra note 16, at 3 (describing variances in the extent and duration of formal
declarations of emergency do not always align with resource scarcity warranting CSC).
232. See infra Part III.A.
233. COMM’R ADAM CRUM, ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., COVID-19 PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY ORDER ADD. (2021).
234. Duda, supra note 157.
235. Idaho Activates Crisis Standards, supra note 180.
236. N.H. GOV. CHRISTOPHER T. SUNUNU, EMERGENCY ORDER #33 PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE
ORDER 2020-04 AS EXTENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-05 (2020).
237. Chacón, supra note 184.
238. Reticence may have resulted as a reaction to a series of articles linking “death panel” terminology
with CSC implementation. See, e.g., Michelle Goldberg, Here Come the Death Panels, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 03/23/opinion/coronavirus-hospital-shortage.html; Michael
Hiltzik, Column: ‘Death Panels’ Arrive—in COVID-Stricken Republican Idaho, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 17,
2021),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-09-17/death-panels-republican-covid-strickenidaho; Danny Westneat, ‘Sophie’s Choice, Over and Over’: Death Panels Are the New Phase of the
Pandemic, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 11, 2021), https://www.seattle times.com/seattle-news/health/ sophieschoice-over-and-over-death-panels-are-the-new-phase-of-the-pandemic/.
239. See Knowles, supra note 196 (explaining that Arkansas is developing a CSC policy, but that,
“[f]or now, hospitals have their own plans . . . [and that] each hospital’s situation is different”; the state
health department’s medical director for health preparedness and response branch, Jerrily Jones opined,
“I don’t think it would be appropriate for us as a state to dictate what is happening at the bedside.”).
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Utah’s CSC plan, for example, relied heavily on hospitals to invoke CSC as
circumstances warrant.240 Even in Arizona and New Mexico, which formally
triggered their CSC plans, state health authorities still deferred to specific
hospitals’ assessments as to when they were in crisis depending on patient
volume and dwindling resources.241 Maryland’s 2022 emergency proclamation
instated certain emergency liability protections while acknowledging that some
hospitals had already been operating under CSC.242 Consequently, hundreds of
hospitals and tens of thousands of HCWs spontaneously operationalized patient
triage efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic without formally invoking CSC.243
Despite common misperceptions, however, CSC is not triggered solely by
the declaration of an emergency, disaster, or PHE.244 Rather, shifts to CSC are
justified by the sustained scarcity of resources coupled with patient surges in
emergencies. Consequently, multiple legal triggers may signal shifts to CSC in
addition to express state emergency declarations or invocations of CSC plans,245
as illustrated in Table 4.
Table 4. Potential Legal Triggers for CSC
TYPES
Federal
Guidance

SOURCES
• National Academies

EXAMPLES
December 18, 2020: NASEM
and others expressly call for the

240. See UTAH HOSP. A’SSN CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE WORKGROUP, supra note 90, at 2
(explaining that guidelines may only apply in an affected area of the state and that “[i]ndividual healthcare
facilities and organizations will manage their responses through their designated emergency operations
plans and incident command structures”).
241. Arizona’s Department of Health Services officially activated CSC in June 2020 under the
recognition that “an individual hospital’s status may fall within the continuum of contingency and crisis
standards of care,” listing recommendations, but ultimately leaving determinations and actions to
individual facilities. AzHHA member advisory – COVID-19: June 30, ARIZ. HOSP. & HEALTHCARE ASS’N
(June 30, 2020), https://www.azhha.org/azhha_member_advisory_covid_19_june_30; see also John
Ingold, Some Hospitals Resorted to Crisis Triage During the Pandemic. A Colorado Doctor Says More
Should Have., COLO. SUN (Oct. 11, 2021, 4:01 AM), https://coloradosun.com/2021/10/11/coronavirushospitals-crisis-standards-of-care/?mc_cid=ad9bb37d4d&mc_eid=cd2672f1e0 (quoting Dr. Matt Wynia
in discussing Arizona and New Mexico’s CSC declarations, explaining that “in both instances, the state
basically said, ‘If you need to, you can do these triage protocols.’ But they were not required. No one said,
You have to set up a triage team. You have to do load balancing across different hospital systems.”).
242. MD. OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 186.
243. See supra Part II.B.
244. As the IOM Committee originally noted in 2009, “[t]he formal declaration that [CSC is] in
operation enables specific legal/regulatory powers and protections for healthcare providers in the
necessary tasks of allocating and using scarce medical resources and implementing alternate care facility
operations.” IOM, CSC LETTER REP., supra note 1, at 18 (emphasis added). Montana incorporates this
into its’ state definition of CSC as a change “formally declared by a state government . . . [,] enabl[ing]
specific legal/regulatory power and protections for healthcare providers in . . . allocating and using scarce
medical resources and implementing alternate care facility operations.” MONT. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS, supra note 89, at 1.
245. See Mehta & Wynia, supra note 23, at 55 (arguing for development of “automatic triggers” for
CSC invocations based on observed medical trends instead of relying on political actors).
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TYPES

Emergency
Declarations

Executive
Orders

Existing
CSC Plans

Regional
Agreements

Health Care
Entity
Experiences

SOURCES
• HHS, ASPR, CDC &
other agencies
• Federal or state
emergency
declarations
• Local PHEs

• Gubernatorial
emergency order
• State or local health
commissioner
• Express language of
extant plans
• Specific addenda or
clarifications
• Emergency
Management
Assistance Compact
• Hospital resource
sharing contracts
• Express allowance via
state plans
• Assessed field
experiences

207

EXAMPLES
invocation of CSC in response to
COVID-19.246
July 29, 2021: Arkansas
Governor Hutchinson declares a
PHE in response to the COVID19 Delta variant causing an
“unsustainable strain on Arkansas
hospitals already struggling to
staff their facilities.”247
September 21, 2021: Alaska
Department of Health and Social
Services Commissioner issues an
order to implement CSC in
response to COVID-19.248
April 10, 2020: Pennsylvania
releases interim CSC guidelines
regarding COVID-19.249
June 6, 2013: D.C. Emergency
Healthcare Coalition issues a
memorandum of understanding
addressing CSC allocations for
member organizations.250
November 3, 2021: San Juan
Regional Medical Center (NM)
activates CSC in response to
COVID patient surges.251

While CSC can be invoked on a facility, local, state, or regional basis under
multiple legal foundations, uncertainties arise when CSC-related triggers

246. National Organizations Call for Action to Implement Crisis Standards of Care During COVID19 Surge, NAT’L ACAD. OF MED. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://nam.edu/national-organizations-call-for-actionto-implement-crisis-standards-of-care-during-covid-19-surge/.
247. Ark. Exec. Order No. EO 21-14, supra note 219.
248. COMM’R ADAM CRUM, supra note 233.
249. PA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, INTERIM PENNSYLVANIA CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR PANDEMIC
GUIDELINES 1 (2020), https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/Documents/Diseases%20and%20Conditions/
COVID-19%20Interim%20Crisis%20Standards%20of%20Care.pdf.
250. D.C. EMERGENCY HEALTHCARE COALITION, MODIFIED DELIVERY OF CRITICAL CARE SERVICES
IN SCARCE RESOURCE SITUATIONS 1 (2013), https://files.asprtracie.hhs.gov/documents/modified%20
delivery%20of%20critical%20care%20services.pdf.
251. San Juan Regional Medical Center Reports Extremely High COVID Patient Volumes, SAN JUAN
REG’L MED. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.sanjuanregional.com/News/San-Juan-Regional-MedicalCenter-Enacts-Crisis-Standards-of-Care?showBack=true&PageIndex=1.
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conflict. For example, federal health authorities may support the need for
hospitals in areas of infectious disease to implement CSC via a PREP Act
declaration while specific states in the region either fail to declare a PHE or reinstate a prior declaration.252 Hospitalists and HCWs in these jurisdictions may
feel ill-equipped legally to shift to CSC even as patient levels surge and resources
become scarce.
Assessing available legal options under any of the possible triggers is
dispositive. Federal PREP Act declarations, for example, provide an array of
powers enabling effective CSC implementation.253 First, the PREP Act
authorizes federal supremacy over the allocation, use, and administration of
MCMs in emergency circumstances.254 Second, it contains strong preemptive
language blocking contrary or conflicting state laws.255 Third, the federal
government can affect scope of practice or licensure reciprocity limitations and
provide for expanded telehealth practices to facilitate CSC implementation when
staff are in short supply.256 Fourth, the PREP Act257 immunizes HCWs and
entities for losses relating to or resulting from administration of covered
MCMs.258 Each of these PREP Act powers supports CSC implementation, even
in states where emergency declarations are lacking.

252. See supra Part II.C.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d.
254. Id.
255. Id. § 247d-6d(b)(8); see also Barbara J. Evans & Ellen W. Clayton, Federal COVID-19 Response
Unlawfully Blocks State Public Health Efforts, PETRIE-FLOM CTR. HARV. L. (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/22/federal-covid19-response-nevada-preemption/
(explaining that on October 8, 2020, HHS sent a letter informing Nevada officials that the state could not
halt the use of certain EUA COVID-19 rapid tests, as the action was “inconsistent with and preempted by
federal law, and, as such, must cease immediately or appropriate action will be taken against those
involved”).
256. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government made use of this power to enable
pharmacists to administer the COVID-19 vaccination nationally under certain conditions, despite potential
conflicting state laws. 85 Fed. Reg. 52,136, 52,140 (Aug. 24, 2020); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR LICENSED PHARMACISTS & PHARMACY INTERNS REGARDING COVID-19
VACCINES & IMMUNITY UNDER THE PREP ACT (2020), https://www.hhs.gov/guidance/sites/default/
files/hhs-guidance-documents/licensed-pharmacists-and-pharmacy-interns-regarding-covid-19-vaccinesimmunity.pdf. The federal government also enabled telehealth delivery, providing protections so that
healthcare practitioners could “order or administer” MCMs “for patients in a state other than the state
where the healthcare personnel are permitted to practice.” 85 Fed. Reg. 79,190, 79,191 (Dec. 9, 2020).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d.
258. Id. § 247d-6d(a)(1), (i)(1). This protection is broad, providing immunity for death, injury,
property damage, and more; however, willful misconduct is excluded. PREP Act Q&As, PUB. HEALTH
EMERGENCY (Dec. 22, 2021), https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/prepact/Pages/prepqa.aspx#
immune3. Litigation has emerged on the breadth of these liability protections. See Maglioli v. All. HC
Holdings, 16 F.4th 393, 411 (3d Cir. 2021). On October 20, 2021, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the PREP Act does not completely preempt state law, and that a state court would have to determine
whether nursing facility negligence claims could be litigated. Id. Judicial interpretations may shape the
extent of the Act’s liability protections for entities undertaking actions involving MCMs during
emergencies. Id.
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B. Facilitating Regional Coordination
Regional cooperation and coordination among public and private sectors
are imperative to advancing equitable outcomes and saving maximum lives
during CSC. Yet, distinct legal challenges arise from widespread variations in
jurisdictional definitions of emergency, CSC, and triggers for execution.259
Allocations of powers between federal and state governments complicate
coordination within and across jurisdictions.260 Addressing these challenges is
vital to cross-sectoral planning and response efforts.
In the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, the lack of regional
coordination in approaching patient surges and resulting health care responses
across several U.S. jurisdictions was apparent.261 Deluged hospitals reported
difficulties in transferring patients to nursing homes, hospice facilities, and even
other hospitals with available bed capacity.262 In some cases, available hospital
beds and other resources were in short supply.263 In other instances, bed
availability data were unavailable, unclear, or simply wrong.264 In an example
repeated across dozens of hospitals nationally, one hospital in Queens, New York
was “besieged” by patients in May 2020, while roughly 3,500 beds were
available in other facilities only twenty minutes away.265 New York State
subsequently created a live map of conditions and available beds to facilitate
transfer and avoid overwhelming conditions.266
Additional coordination problems surfaced elsewhere. From May to June
2020, southern California health care facilities were stymied by unwarranted
rejections or delays concerning “COVID-19 patients based on their insurance

259. See supra Parts I.C., Table 2, II.C, Figure 4, & III.A.
260. James G. Hodge, Jr., Nationalizing Public Health Emergency Legal Responses, 49 J.L., MED. &
ETHICS 315, 316 (2021).
261. See Hick et al., supra note 16, at 5 (documenting numerous data and surveillance challenges
related to handling patient surges during the COVID-19 pandemic).
262. CHRISTI A. GRIMM, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., HOSPITALS REPORTED THAT THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC HAS SIGNIFICANTLY STRAINED HEALTH
CARE DELIVERY 3 (2021).
263. Jim Dwyer, One Hospital Was Besieged by the Virus. Nearby Was ‘Plenty of Space.,’ N.Y. TIMES
(May 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/nyregion/coronavirus-ny-hospitals.html.
264. Corey Jones, State’s Hospital Capacity Data Shows ICU Beds Available While Several Oklahoma
City-Area Hospitals Publicly Say They Have None, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 10, 2021), https://tulsaworld
.com/news/state-and-regional/states-hospital-capacity-data-shows-icu-beds-available-while-severaloklahoma-city-area-hospitals-publicly/article_5bbeba86-0c00-11ec-bda4-373b16892ec4.html.
265. Dwyer, supra note 263.
266. Health Facility Map, N.Y. STATE HEALTH DATA, https://health.data.ny.gov/Health/HealthFacility-Map/875v-tpc8 (last visited Feb. 11, 2022). Even so, participants in an October 2020 New York
hospital forum expressed frustration with the lack of a state-level response to facilitate transfer to other
facilities with available beds. TONER ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
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status.”267 Long waits resulted in some patients “arriv[ing] at their destination
with damaged lungs from poorly controlled ventilators.”268 One St. Louis
physician explained in September 2020 that rural hospital transfers were to be
rejected at her local hospital unless “absolutely medically necessary.”269 In July
2020, hospitals in Houston, Texas—which lacked information about available
beds in neighboring facilities—sought assistance from the city’s disaster council
to address surging case numbers.270
Calls for federal assistance to help coordinate patient demands emerged.
Real-time efforts to provide a federal data system via HHS, however, met
resistance or proved ineffective at best and inoperable at worst.271 Two systems
were devised in 2020, one through CDC’s existing National Healthcare Safety
Network and another through HHS’ partnership with TeleTracking
Technologies, Inc.272 Both systems tracked different kinds of information,
including available beds and ICU beds,273 PPE status and availability,274
COVID-19 patient numbers,275 and therapeutics distribution.276 Yet, each system
was cumbersome and utilized algorithms resulting in lists “filled with mistakes,”
according to real-time assessments in June 2020.277 A lack of effective
enforcement exacerbated the issues as some facilities did not report, citing
staffing issues, or submitted the same data week-to-week.278 When enforcement
of system reporting requirements was considered, a review of the federal lists
illustrated numerous errors.279
In July 2020, HHS indicated abruptly that hospitals should stop utilizing
CDC’s reporting system and exclusively report through HHS instead, causing

267. Melanie Evans et al., Some California Hospitals Refused Covid-19 Transfers for Financial
Reasons, State Emails Show, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2020 1:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/somecalifornia-hospitals-refused-covid-19-transfers-for-financial-reasons-state-emails-show-11603108814.
268. Melanie Evans & Alexandra Berzon, Why Hospitals Can’t Handle Covid Surges: They’re Flying
Blind, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2020 11:10 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hospitals-covid-surge-data11601478409?mod =articleinline.
269. Dylan Scott, American Are Dying Because No Hospital Will Take Them, VOX (Sept. 14, 2021
12:01 PM), https:// www.vox.com/coronavirus-covid19/2021/9/14/22650733/us-covid-19-hospitals-fulltexas-alabama.
270. Id.
271. Evans & Berzon, supra note 268.
272. Id.
273. Hospital Capacity Data Dashboard, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 16,
2020), https://www. cdc.gov/nhsn/covid19/report-overview.html.
274. Id.
275. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COVID-19 GUIDANCE FOR HOSPITAL REPORTING &
FAQS FOR HOSPITALS, HOSPITAL LABORATORY & ACUTE CARE FACILITY DATA REPORTING 4–9 (2022).
276. COVID-19 Therapeutics Locator, HHS PROTECT PUB. DATA HUB (Oct. 13, 2021), https://protectpublic.hhs.gov/pages/ therapeutics-distribution.
277. Evans & Berzon, supra note 268.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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additional confusion.280 In September 2020, HHS threatened to terminate
Medicare provider agreements for failing to timely report required
information,281 spurring further concern from providers attempting to comply
with shifting data standards while combating patient surges.282 Some speculated
that the quick change would incentivize inaccurate reporting to maintain
funding.283
Hospital experiences and data challenges illustrate just how vital regional
coordination, communication, and cooperation are in avoiding excess morbidity
and mortality during emergencies. Under the U.S. federalist system, CSC
implementation has largely been left to the states284 under national guidance
provided by NASEM and other federal entities. Consequently, states defined and
executed CSC on their own terms, resulting in mismatches in terminology,
approaches, and implementation across geographical borders. Infectious diseases
like COVID-19, however, do not respect jurisdictional borders, affecting persons
indiscriminately.
To counter the reality of burgeoning public health threats, multiple efforts
to improve regional operations are available at the state and federal levels,285
including state-wide implementation of standards for coordination and
communication. During the pandemic, for example, Arizona’s Department of
Health Services organized a 24/7 telephone “Surge Line,” enabling rapid
transfers of over 4,000 COVID-19 patients to available beds state-wide between
April and October 2020.286 Arizona Governor Doug Ducey’s Executive Order
required hospitals to participate and develop internal protocols to “complete . . .
bed placement within thirty minutes,” and mandated health insurers to provide
in-network rate coverage for transfers and treatment.287 While Arizona’s load280. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trump Administration Strips C.D.C. of Control of Coronavirus Data, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/us/politics/trump-cdc-coronavirus.html;
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 275.
281. Pien Huang & Selena Simmons-Duffin, Trump Administration Plans Crackdown on Hospitals
Failing to Report COVID-19 Data, NPR (Sept. 24, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/09/24/916310786/trump-administration-plans-crackdown-on-hospitals-failing-to-reportcovid-19-dat.
282. Kat Jercich, ‘The Goalposts Keep Moving’: Trump Administration Reportedly Plans Crackdown
on Hospitals, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 25, 2020, 5:02 PM), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/
goal-posts-keep-moving-trump-administration-reportedly-plans-crackdown-hospitals.
283. Huang & Simmons-Duffin, supra note 281.
284. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 565 (5th ed.
2015) (explaining that “[s]tate and local governments possess the police power, which means that they
can take any action unless there is a constitutional prohibition.”).
285. See Hick et al., supra note 16, at 5–7 (assessing alternative approaches to generating refined data
and surveillance practices to better assess and respond to patient surges during the COVID-19 pandemic).
286. Lisa Villarroel et al., Collaboration on the Arizona Surge Line: How Covid-19 Became the
Impetus for Public, Private, and Federal Hospitals to Function as One System, NEW ENG. J. MED.
CATALYST, Jan. 22, 2021, at 1, 2–4.
287. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-38 (Mar. 11, 2020).
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balancing approach to alleviate patient gridlocks was implemented on an
emergency basis, states may preemptively engage in similar coordinative efforts
in advance of future emergencies.
Cross-jurisdictional mechanisms such as Medical Operations Coordination
Cells (MOCCs) may also facilitate load-balancing up to and during crises.288 At
federal, regional, or state levels, MOCCs are intended to allocate COVID-19
patients “so that the highest possible level of care can be provided to all patients
who need that care before transitioning hospitals toward crisis measures.”289
Washington State’s MOCC helped flatten its COVID-19 curve from March
through June 2020,290 specifically concerning intrastate patient coordination.291
Innovations like Arizona’s Surge Line and other proposed uniform
communication approaches292 can facilitate enhanced regional coordination in
implementing CSC in future PHEs. Yet, legal barriers remain. Jurisdictional
differences in language framing emergencies, defining CSC, or facilitating
patient transfers can stymie effective cooperation. Emergency declarations,
utilization of existing options through the state-based Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC),293 and executive orders may obviate barriers
posed by differences or a lack of uniformity across states. State or local actions
to legislate or regulate advance measures and options can help assure intrastate
regional coordination. CMS has wide latitude in setting conditions for program
participants.294 Data reporting requirements prioritizing the advance creation and
continued utilization of a single uniform system help to avoid duplicative or
288. NRCC HEALTHCARE RESILIENCE TASK FORCE & ASPR TRACIE, MEDICAL OPERATIONS
COORDINATION CELLS TOOLKIT (2d ed. 2021), https://files.asprtracie.hhs.gov/documents/fema-mocctoolkit.pdf.
289. Id. at 13, 26, 34.
290. Steven H. Mitchell et al., Western Washington State COVID-19 Experience: Keys to Flattening
the Curve and Effective Health System Response, 231 J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 316, 317 (2020).
Washington’s system enabled decompression services for acute care facilities, asked health providers for
regular input of data, and established a set of principles that facilities were requested to abide by to ensure
regional cooperation. NW. HEALTHCARE RESPONSE NETWORK, REGIONAL COVID-19 COORDINATION
CENTER OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 2–3 (2020), http://www.wsha.org/wp-content/uploads/RegionalCOVID-19-Coordination-Center-Operational-Framework_Final_2020_03_27.pdf.
291. However, the subsequent Delta variant outbreak in mid-2021 among largely unvaccinated
residents in neighboring Idaho resulted in an overflow of COVID-19 patients in Washington, evincing the
need for stronger interstate coordination. Mike Baker, ‘Their Crisis’ Is ‘Our Problem’: Washington
Grapples with Idaho Covid Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/13/us/
coronavirus-hospitals-washington-idaho.html.
292. Verity E. Schaye et al., Collaborating Across Private, Public, Community, and Federal Hospital
Systems: Lessons Learned from the Covid-19 Pandemic Response in NYC, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST,
Nov.–Dec. 2020, at 1.
293. Emergency Mgmt. Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996).
294. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(9) (requiring that hospitals, for purposes of Medicare reimbursement,
meet “requirements as the Secretary finds necessary in the interest of the health and safety of individuals
who are furnished services in the institution”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 482.1 (2018) (generally explaining
conditions of participation for hospitals participating in Medicare).
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unclear requirements inhibiting providers’ response efforts. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) can set similar conditions on
expenditures for emergency responses,295 enabling shared approaches and
understanding of CSC across borders.
Federal legislation may also ameliorate regional coordination challenges.
EMTALA296 requires stabilization and treatment of individuals arriving at
emergency departments. EMTALA also mandates that certain hospitals with
higher capabilities accept transfers of persons with emergency medical
conditions.297 New legislation may further enhance uniformity. On March 1,
2021, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and eleven co-sponsors298 reintroduced the Equitable Data Collection and Disclosure on COVID-19 Act299 to
require surveillance systems to disaggregate information and demonstrate
disparate impacts across different demographic categories.300 Acknowledging
the profound impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on persons of color, people
with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples, and low-income communities, Senator
Warren called for “comprehensive national data on who is getting infected, who
is getting treatment, and who is dying.”301 Enhanced uniformity in data collection
and utilization may not only improve regional coordination, but also help limit
disparate impacts for certain populations in implementing CSC, as discussed
below.

295. 44 C.F.R. § 206.62 (2018).
296. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1395dd.
297. Id. § 1395dd. EMTALA’s transfer requirements exemplify federal legislative efforts to facilitate
coordinated responses to medical care and treatment. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Waiver of EMTALA Re:
Hospital Implementation of Crisis Standards of Care During the COVID-19 Pandemic, NETWORK FOR
PUB. HEALTH L. (2021), https:// www.networkforphl.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Guidance-Waiverof-EMTALA-Re-Hospital-Implementation-of-Crisis-Standards-of-Care-During-the-COVID-19Pandemic.pdf (explaining that specific EMTALA waivers implemented during the pandemic allowed for
redirection of patients for screening at alternative locations). While certain provisions of EMTALA may
be waived during emergencies, requirements to accept transfers may not. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(b)(3)
(allowing for transfer of un-stabilized patients as necessary and establishment of alternative locations for
completion of medical screening pursuant to waivers during emergency circumstances).
298. Sen. Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ), Sen.
Tim Kaine (D-VA), Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Sen. Edward Markey (D-MA), Sen. Jeff Merkley (DOR), Sen. Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Sen. Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), and Sen.
Ron Wyden (D-OR) co-sponsored the Act. S.512, 117th Cong. (2021).
299. S. 512.
300. Press Release, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senate, Warren, Pressley, Lee, Kelly, Bass,
Colleagues Re-Introduce Bicameral Legislation to Require Federal Government to Collect and Report
Coronavirus Demographic Data—Including Race and Ethnicity (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.warren
.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-pressley-lee-kelly-bass-colleagues-re-introduce-bicamerallegislation-to-require-federal-government-to-collect-and-report-coronavirus-demographic-data_—
including-race-and-ethnicity.
301. Id.
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C. Limiting Discriminatory Impacts in Implementation

Incomplete data, ignorance of existing systemic barriers,302 lack of effective
CSC planning,303 and variances in CSC implementation contributed to a “perfect
storm” that perpetuated disparate treatments and poor health outcomes among
at-risk populations nationally.304 The future of CSC depends on assurances that
plans and their execution do not perpetuate and exacerbate health disparities.305
From the onset of the pandemic, several disability rights organizations
identified the potential for discriminatory impacts in CSC plans and
implementation.306 They corresponded directly with state leaders and filed
complaints with HHS’ Office for Civil Rights (OCR) alleging that state CSC or
triage plans incorporated discriminatory implementation criteria tending to
screen out patients with disabilities or advanced age.307 Alabama’s 2010
ventilator allocation criteria, for example, deprioritized access for “[p]ersons
with severe or profound mental retardation, moderate to severe dementia, or
catastrophic neurological complications.”308 Utah’s CSC plan allegedly
disqualified “persons with advanced neuromacular disease, dementia, Cystic
Fibrosis, and other disabilities requiring assistance with daily living from
receiving lifesaving care during a [PHE].”309
OCR negotiated with these and other states to update their CSC plans and
eliminate discriminatory language,310 including: (1) categorical exclusions of
specific persons or populations and (2) CSC assessments utilizing long-term
302. See ELIZABETH TOBIN-TYLER & JOEL B. TEITELBAUM, ESSENTIALS OF HEALTH JUSTICE: A
PRIMER 61–86 (2019) (describing various social and structural barriers to health, including factors such
as access to health care, education, and employment).
303. See Catherine L. Aurieamma et al., Eliminating Categorical Exclusion Criteria in Crisis
Standards of Care Frameworks, 20 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28, 32 (2020) (asserting that emergency
circumstances compounded these unjustifiable outcomes through lack of planning and resort to emergency
ad hoc decision-making, which can incorporate conscious and unconscious biases).
304. Manchanda et al., Inequity in Crisis Standards of Care, supra note 28, at 1.
305. See Hick et al., supra note 16, at 2 (arguing that CSC protocols “cannot be expected to remedy
historic and structural inequity, however, they should not exacerbate underlying disparities”).
306. Michelle M. Mello et al., Respecting Disability Rights—Toward Improved Crisis Standards of
Care, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED., July 30, 2020, at 1.
307. Id.
308. ALA. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, ANNEX TO ESF 8 OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS PLAN: CRITERIA FOR MECHANICAL VENTILATOR TRIAGE FOLLOWING PROCLAMATION OF
MASS-CASUALTY RESPIRATORY EMERGENCY 8 (2010), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6846alabama-triage-guidelines/02cb4c58460e57ea9f05/optimized/full.pdf.
309. OCR Resolves Complaint with Utah After it Revised Crisis Standards of Care to Protect Against
Age and Disability Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://public3.pagefreezer.com/content/HHS.gov/31-12-2020T08:51/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/
2020/08/20/ocr-resolves-complaint-with-utah-after-revised-crisis-standards-of-care-to-protect-againstage-disability-discrimination.html.
310. Piatt & Hodge, Jr., Crisis Standards of Care, supra note 29, at 2–3; Civil Rights and COVID-19,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. OFF. C.R. (July 26, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/forproviders/civil-rights-covid19/index.html.
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survivability.311 While OCR’s specific recommendations focused predominantly
on age- and disability-based discrimination, consideration of long-term
survivability underlying allocations can also result in racial disparities. Black
populations historically have lower life expectancies on average than White
populations.312 In July 2020, OCR clarified that civil rights protections
prohibiting race, color, and national origin discrimination continued to fully
apply during the COVID-19 pandemic.313
Persons earning low wages also experienced disparate impacts as smaller,
poorly funded hospitals typically serving Medicaid populations or people of
color were tasked with treating exorbitant numbers of patients with COVID19.314 In Los Angeles, one hospital predominantly serving low-income
communities experienced heightened rates of death among patients with
COVID-19 and “treated more Covid patients than some Los Angeles hospitals
three to four times its size.”315 A July 2020 assessment found that COVID-19
patients admitted to hospitals with fewer ICU beds were more likely to die.316
Equitable allocation of limited resources during PHEs was a central
objective underlying CSC identified by the IOM Committee in 2009.317 Legally
accomplishing it proved challenging during the COVID-19 pandemic especially
given specific requirements or limits under equal protection principles318 as well
as statutory antidiscrimination protections like the Americans with Disabilities
Act,319 Civil Rights Act, Title VI,320 and the Age Discrimination Act.321
Avoiding discriminatory resource allocations through CSC requires careful legal

311. Civil Rights and COVID-19, supra note 310.
312. Jiaquan Xu et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2019, 70 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REPS., July 26, 2021, at
1, 13–14.
313. See Civil Rights Protections Prohibiting Race, Color & National Origin Discrimination During
COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. FOR C.R. IN ACTION (July 20, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/title-vi-bulletin.pdf (explaining that recipients of federal financial
assistance needed to ensure “that individuals from racial and ethnic minority groups are not . . . rejected
for hospital admissions[] or denied access to intensive care units compared to similarly situated nonminority individuals”).
314. Caroline Kelly et al., Low-Income COVID-19 Patients Die Needlessly Because They Are Stuck
in the Wrong Hospitals—While the Right Hospitals Too Often Shut Them Out, HEALTH AFFS. (Apr. 2,
2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20210401.95800/full/. At least one hospital
CEO disclosed a plan to try treating all patients who arrived, fearing the loss of revenue upon transfer. Id.
315. Sheri Fink, Dying of Covid in a ‘Separate and Unequal’ L.A. Hospital, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4,
2021), https://www. nytimes.com/2021/02/08/us/covid-los-angeles.html?smid=url-share.
316. Shruti Gupta et al., Factors Associated with Death in Critically Ill Patients with Coronavirus
Disease 2019 in the US, 180 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1436, 1441 (2020).
317. Hick et al., supra note 16, at 2.
318. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
319. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
320. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
321. Id. § 6102.
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assessments and explicit incorporation of principles of health justice322 centered
on the social determinants of health,323 as per the process illustrated in Figure 5,
below.
Figure 5. Incorporating Health Justice324

The Presidential COVID-19 Health Equity Task Force’s final report
recommends additional research to avoid discriminatory impacts in CSC325 and
incentivize adherence to NASEM’s CSC guidance via “accreditation and
reimbursement requirements.”326 Increasing Medicaid reimbursement or

322. Health justice encompasses “laws, policies, systems, and behaviors that are evenhanded with
regard to and display genuine respect for everyone’s health and well-being.” TOBIN-TYLER &
TEITELBAUM, supra note 302, at 167; see also Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Systemic Racism,
the Government’s Pandemic Response, and Racial Inequities in COVID-19, 70 EMORY L.J. 1419, 1431
(2021) (recommending adoption of the health justice framework to “eradicate racial inequities” that
resulted during the COVID-19 pandemic).
323. Social determinants broadly refer to “environments where people are born, live, work, play,
worship, and age” which affect their health. Social Determinants of Health, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. OFF. OF DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, https://health.gov/healthypeople/
objectives-and-data/social-determinants-health (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
324. PAULA BRAVEMAN ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., WHAT IS HEALTH EQUITY? AND
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES A DEFINITION MAKE? 6 (2017).
325. PRESIDENTIAL COVID-19 HEALTH EQUITY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS
76 (2021), https://www.minorityhealth.hhs.gov/assets/pdf/HETF_Report_508_102821_9am_508Team%
20WIP11.pdf (“The Federal Government should support research to better understand the ways in which
states’ [CSC] intersect with ableism and ageism, as well as how disproportionately impacted communities
of color and other underserved populations should be supported.”).
326. See id. at 34 (encouraging the federal government to widely disseminate CSC, explain CSC
benefits, and suggest their adoption).
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incentivizing transfers to avoid limitations for persons experiencing lower
incomes may promote health justice.327 CSC planners may also consider
utilization of the Social Vulnerability Index (SVI)328 or Area Deprivation Index
(ADI),329 both of which assess geographic deprivations nationally.330 ADI does
not expressly prioritize persons on the basis of race, which may help it withstand
potential equal protection-based challenges.331 Finally, planners may look to
organizational actions prioritizing equity for help in shaping CSC plans.332
D. Defending “Tie-Breaker” Decisions
Avoiding disparate health impacts through CSC allocations on the macrolevel is essential, but policymakers and planners must also confront critical issues
of micro-level decisions involving specific patients when lives are on the line.
These are among the most controversial legal challenges hospitals and HCWs
face in implementing CSC—the tough, “tie-breaking” choices that must be made
when there are more patients than there are beds, treatments, or staff to assist
them. As with any tie-breaker scenario, there are winners and losers.
Consequences of these decisions in CSC, however, can be the difference between
life or death.333
Resource availability—including hospital staff and beds—statistically
correlates with heightened COVID-19 mortality rates.334 It is a hard reality
underlying CSC during the pandemic: some patients died directly from the
effects of COVID-19; others expired from a lack of health care access or poor
327. Kelly et al., supra note 314.
328. At a Glance: CDC/ATSDR Social Vulnerability Index, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES &
DISEASE REGISTRY (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/placeandhealth/svi/at-a-glance_svi.html
(“CDC/ATSDR SVI is a database that helps emergency response planners and public health officials
identify, map, and plan support for communities that will most likely need support before, during, and
after a [PHE].”).
329. “An area deprivation index (ADI) is a multidimensional evaluation of a region’s socioeconomic
conditions, which have been linked to health outcomes (1–6).” Andrew R. Maroko et al., Integrating
Social Determinants of Health with Treatment and Prevention: A New Tool to Assess Local Area
Deprivation, 13 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, Sept. 2016, at 1; see also James G. Hodge, Jr. et al.,
Diminishing Disparities in U.S. Crisis Standards of Care: Medical and Legal Challenges, 34 ECLINICAL
MED., Apr. 1, 2021, at 1 [hereinafter Hodge, Jr. et al., Diminishing Disparities] (noting that decisions
regarding interventions may be based on the ADI, “where most benefits accrue to those in at-risk areas”).
330. Harald Schmidt et al., Is It Lawful and Ethical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19
Vaccines?, 324 JAMA 2023, 2024 (2020).
331. Id.
332. For example, NASEM developed guidance on how to allocate COVID-19 vaccinations
incorporating equity as a crosscutting consideration for access, specifically indicating indices like SVI to
help prioritization across geographic areas. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., FRAMEWORK FOR
EQUITABLE ALLOCATION OF COVID-19 VACCINE 8–9 (2020). The plan also prioritized persons living in
congregate settings (e.g., homeless shelters) and essential workers in the first and second phases of
allocations. Id. at 10.
333. Hodge, Jr. & Piatt, Legal Decision-making, supra note 23.
334. Kadri et al., supra note 188, at 1.
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coordination. Hospital triage committees and clinicians responsible for tiebreaking decisions have the Herculean task of balancing an array of medical,
ethical, and practical dynamics. They must also (1) consider critical “tripping
points” regarding factors they may not legally take into account; and (2) address
legal inconsistencies in CSC approaches across states.
As illustrated in Figure 6, a long list of considerations, including patients’
race, color, ethnicity, or sex, are legally forbidden as criteria for CSC tiebreaking decisions.335 Patients’ religious affiliations, ability to pay, social worth,
vaccination status, and categorical exclusions based solely on age, disability, or
long-term survivability are also “off the table” in multiple jurisdictions.336
Figure 6. Unlawful Legal Bases for CSC Tie-Breakers

CSC decision-makers cannot make real-time choices based on numerous
legally prohibited factors, but often lack explicit or meaningful guidance
concerning criteria they can use.337 A 2020 Johns Hopkins report noted how
insufficient CSC guidelines in New York left bedside clinicians having “to make
the least bad decision under extraordinary circumstances.”338 This is untenable.
As NASEM observed on March 28, 2020, “[e]xtreme scarcity can necessitate
difficult life-and-death decisions. [HCWs making] them must have adequate
guidance . . . to follow the rule of law.”339
Instead, CSC decision makers face a panoply of differing tie-breaking
approaches across states. As documented in Table 4 below, select states’ CSC
plans (1) define tie-breaking scenarios concerning scarcity generally (e.g.,
Montana, Washington) or related to specific resources (e.g., ventilators in

335. As noted above, HHS/OCR warned states to avoid unlawful discrimination across HHS-funded
programs. Several states subsequently adjusted their CSC plans at OCR’s urging. See supra Part III.C.
336. Arizona law expressly prohibits resource allocations based on religion or veteran/income status.
ARIZ. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., ARIZ. CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE PLAN 92 (2021).
337. Hodge, Jr. & Piatt, Legal Decision-making, supra note 23.
338. TONER ET AL., supra note 21, at 8.
339. NASEM, CSC RAPID CONSULTATION, supra note 22, at 5.
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Colorado and ICUs in Utah) [column I], and then (2) provide explicit guidance
for how to prioritize patients under such scenarios [column II].340
Table 4. Select Tie-Breaker Criteria Among State CSC Plans
I. State
Tiebreakers
Colorado – “Assign
Limited Ventilators
to Patients Most
Likely to Benefit if
No Other Options
Are Available”341

Idaho – “In the
event that there are
more patients in a
Priority Category
than there are
critical care
resources/ventilators
. . . .”343
Kansas – no explicit
situational context
provided345

II. Tiebreaker Guidance
1. “[A]ssess patient acuity using SOFA . . . scoring
table and/or other parameters appropriate to the
situation (agent-specific prognostic indicators,
modifications based on agent involved).”
2. “Compared to other patient(s) requiring and
awaiting external ventilation/oxygenation, does this
patient have significant differences in prognosis or
resource utilization in one or more categories [omitted]
that would justify re-allocation of the ventilator/unit?
. . . Injury/epidemiologic factors may have the highest
predictive value in some cases and may also affect the
predictive ability of the SOFA score.”
3. “Re-allocate ventilator/resource only if patient . . .
with respiratory failure has significantly better chance
of survival/benefit as compared to patient currently
receiving ventilation.”342
1. “[C]hildren ages 0-17.”
2. “[P]pregnant women with a viable pregnancy ≥ 28
weeks of gestation.”
3. “[P]atients based on lifecycle, prioritizing those
patients who have lived through fewer lifecycles . . . .”
4. “[Individuals] who perform tasks that are vital to the
public health response of the crisis at hand, including
. . . those whose work directly supports the provision
of acute care to others.”
5. “[Lottery] (i.e., random allocation). . . .”344
“Once a determination has been made that a patient
qualifies for the resource under the SOFA score, and a
patient’s priority category has been determined,

340. MONT. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 89, at 39–40; WASH. ST. DEP’T OF
HEALTH, supra note 91, at 28; COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T., supra note 85, at 47–48; UTAH
HOSP. ASS’N CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE WORKGROUP, supra note 90, at 7.
341. COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T., supra note 85, at 47.
342. Id. at 47–48.
343. IDAHO DEP’T OF HEALTH & WELFARE, PATIENT CARE STRATEGIES FOR SCARCE RESOURCE
SITUATIONS 8 (2020), https://coronavirus.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/2020_ID_CSC_
Strategies_v2_Final_Posted-1.pdf.
344. Id.
345. KAN. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T, supra note 86, at 16.
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I. State
Tiebreakers

Massachusetts –
[Situations] . . . in
which . . . there are
not enough critical
care resources for
all patients within
[a] priority
group. . . .” 347

Montana –
“Resolving ‘ties’
within the same
Priority Category
Patients in higher
priority categories
should be given
scarce resources
over patients in
lower priority
categories. . . .
Priority category is
the primary
determinant of who
gets scarce
resources.”349

Utah – Concerning
ICU/ ventilator care
if “two patients
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

II. Tiebreaker Guidance
within-category priority will be established on a firstcome, first-served basis or on a random
selection/lottery basis, depending on feasibility of
implementation.”346
“[R]aw priority scores will determine the priority order
for patients in the same priority group (the lower the
score, the higher the priority). In some circumstances,
it may be ethically permissible to conserve scarce
critical care resources during times of high demand to
assure that the resources are available to those with the
best prognoses.” Other scoring considerations include
pregnancy, life cycle considerations, reasonable
accommodation, contribution to public health
response and maintenance of societal order, lottery,
under 18, and non-survivable conditions.348
1. “Children . . . . (patients under 18 years of age)
should have priority for scarce resources over adults.”
2. “Raw SOFA Score. [G]ive priority to patients with
lower SOFA Scores when the difference in score
predicts significant differences in survival
probability.”
3. “Life Cycle Considerations. . . . When there are
large age differences between patients (for example, >
30 years. . . .), resources should be allocated to
significantly younger patients.”
4. “Patients Already Receiving Scarce Resources. . . .”
5. “Random Allocation. . . . use random selection (i.e.,
lottery) to determine which patient(s) shall receive
resources.”350
Ventilators Brought to Facility by Patient:
Ventilators patients bring with them from home to
facilities “will not be removed from the patient
bringing the ventilator to reallocate to other
patients.”351
“Pregnancy: Patients with pregnancy may represent
two lives, and thus giving them priority is aligned with
‘do the greatest good for the greatest number.’

Id.
EXEC. OFF. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 87, at 21–22.
Id. at 21–22.
MONT. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 89, at 37–38.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 40.
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I. State
Tiebreakers
cannot be
distinguished
relative to short
term outcome after
the individualized
assessments
[previously]
conducted . . . , a
tiebreaker may need
to be used in order
to determine which
patient receives the
limited
resource[.]”352

Washington –
“[W]hen there are
not enough medical
resources for
patients who have
the same likelihood
to survive to
discharge (i.e., are
in the same priority
level in the
prioritization
scale).”354

221

II. Tiebreaker Guidance
Accordingly, such patients with MSOFA scores above
the Crisis MSOFA Cutoff should be considered for
continued ICU/ventilator care, unless their clinical
condition or expressed wishes indicate otherwise.”
1. “[I]f one patient’s clinical trajectory is declining
more rapidly than the other patient needing the same
limited resource, the limited resource should be
assigned to the patient with the less rapid rate of
clinical decline, and thus the greatest prospect of shortterm survival.”
2. “[A] judgment should be made of which patient has
the greater prospect of short-term survival based on
additional clinical judgment of patient’s record and
overall presentation of relevant symptoms, combined
with use of recommended assessment tools . . . , so
long as this judgment is not based on any unlawful
considerations of race, color, national origin,
disability, age, or sex.”
3. “[A]ssign the limited resource by randomization to
lottery.”353
1. “The resource remains with the patient who already
has the resource as long as the patient is not clinically
worsening.”
2. “The resource goes to a pregnant patient.”
3. “The resource goes to the patient with the highest
SVI score based on the following: i) SVI score (highest
rank = 10, based on home address); and
ii) Unhoused individuals will receive a score based on
their last known address (i.e., shelter, hospital) or the
current location of services.”
4. “Randomization using the Excel Randomization
Tool.”355

Consistent with the factors documented in Table 4, chances of survival over
similarly-situated patients in CSC tie-breaking scenarios depend on an array of
primary criteria including: (1) persons with sufficiently low Sequential Organ
Failure Assessment (SOFA) scores (CO, MA), (2) minors (ID, MT), (3) pregnant
women (UT), (4) patients who already received a limited resource (WA), and (5)

352.
353.
354.
355.

UTAH HOSP. ASS’N CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE WORKGROUP, supra note 90, at 7.
Id.
WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 91, at 30.
Id.
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patients arriving on a “first-come, first-served” basis (KS).356 Stated simply, if
patient X (a 38-year-old pregnant woman) and patient Y (a 16-year-old male)
face similar medical prognoses absent immediate access to a single ventilator,
patient X would gain access in Utah, while patient Y would win in Idaho.357
When initial prioritizations do not completely resolve tie-breakers for
access to limited resources, additional sub-criteria in states’ CSC plans diverge
further. These secondary factors include epidemiological considerations (CO),
life-cycle assessments (ID), lotteries (KS), patients contributing to the
“maintenance of social order,” (MA), patients who brought their vents to their
facilities (MT), patients’ “rate of clinical decline,” (UT), and SVI scores
(WA).358 Thus, if patient A and patient B are medically-similar pregnant women
in Washington State, patient A would gain access to the limited resource if her
SVI score is higher than patient B’s score.359
Facing a smorgasbord of CSC tie-breaking options across states, it is hardly
surprising that triage committees and clinicians struggle to assess the legalities
of their decisions. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and future PHEs,
tie-breaking quagmires should be resolved through effective, fair, and sound
decisions that are medically, ethically, and legally defensible based on factors
illustrated in Figure 7, below.
Figure 7. Lawful Bases for CSC Tie-Breakers

356. COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, supra note 85, at 47–48; IDAHO DEP’T OF HEALTH &
WELFARE, supra note 343, at 8; KAN. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T, supra note 86, at 16; EXEC. OFF. OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 87, at 21–22; MONT. DEP’T OF PUB.
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 89, at 50; UTAH HOSP. ASS’N CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE
WORKGROUP, supra note 90, at 7; WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 91, at 30.
357. UTAH HOSP. ASS’N CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE WORKGROUP, supra note 90, at 7; IDAHO DEP’T
OF HEALTH & WELFARE, supra note 343, at 8.
358. COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, supra note 85, at 47–48; IDAHO DEP’T OF HEALTH &
WELFARE, supra note 343, at 8; KAN. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T, supra note 86, at 16; EXEC. OFF. OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 87, at 21–22; MONT. DEP’T OF PUB.
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 89, at 50; UTAH HOSP. ASS’N CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE
WORKGROUP, supra note 90, at 7; WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 91, at 30.
359. WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 91, at 30.
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Defensible legal criteria to render tie-breaking decisions involving patient
care in crises include determinations of specific resource limits or suitability
(e.g., medical equipment solely available for use among pediatric/neonatal
patients) as well as current medical or public health trends or information.
Additional considerations include:
(1) individualized medical assessments – assessments based on
individualized prognostics concerning patient benefits to limited
resources guided by the best available medical and public health
evidence are permissible and preferable in lieu of categorical
exclusions prohibited by law;360
(2) equitable use of clinical scores – clinical assessment scores are
controversial,361 but can be considered if they do not disparately
impact specific groups.362 Massachusetts’ CSC tie-breaking
criteria, for example, recommend limiting the number of points
assigned to patients via SOFA scoring to help correct
demonstrable inequities;363
(3) short-term survivability – patient survivability up to hospital
discharge (or immediately afterward) may be considered as
contrasted with long-term survivability, which can perpetuate age-,
disability-, or race-based discrimination;364
(4) age (as a prognostic factor) – in limited circumstances, age may be
a clinical factor relevant to individualized assessments, and thus
lawfully permissible as a distinguishing factor;365
(5) patient/surrogate informed consent and choices – respect for
individual autonomy includes the freedom to decline medical
treatment so long as patients or their surrogates are not steered or
coerced into deleterious choices;366

360. Hodge, Jr. & Piatt, Legal Decision-making, supra note 23, at 3.
361. See Hick et al., supra note 16, at 10–11 (describing how many healthcare providers “relied
heavily on [SOFA] scores. Limitations of the SOFA score have been recognized and publicized prior to
COVID-19.”).
362. Hodge, Jr. et al., Diminishing Disparities, supra note 329, at 1.
363. EXEC. OFF. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 87, at 21–22.
364. See infra Part III.C.
365. See National Organizations Call for Action, supra note 246 (recommending that hospitals
“[m]ake resource allocation decisions based on individualized assessments of each patient, using the best
available objective medical evidence concerning likelihood of death prior to or imminently after hospital
discharge, including clinical factors relevant and available to such determinations, which may include age
under limited circumstances”).
366. TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES R. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 58 (5th ed.
2001); Hick et al., supra note 16, at 9–10 (“Patients that voluntarily raise the possibility of foregoing
services or resources that are in shortage have the legal and ethical right to decline services, but extreme
caution must be exercised not to pressure patients into “altruistic” acts that are not consistent with their
underlying values.”).
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(6) HCW status – prioritizing HCWs on the frontlines who face risks
in treating patients with COVID-19 or other infectious conditions
is based on ethical principles of reciprocity, employment contracts,
and duties of HCWs pursuant to their licensure;
(7) reasonable modifications to assure equal access for disabled or
aged persons – blatant discrimination in CSC decision-making
based on disability, age, or other unlawful factors is rare or
difficult to uncover. What can emerge from repeated decisions,
however, are unintended impacts on persons with disabilities or
advanced age. In such cases, as authorized by OCR, reasonable
modifications to tie-breaking criteria can help assure equitable
access to limited resources;367 and
(8) appeals – CSC tie-breaking decisions invariably must be made,
and often on an expedited basis. “Winners” are entitled to access
scarce resources. “Losers” deserve a second chance. While the
shifting nature of CSC implementation in the throes of PHEs may
sustain constant adjustments in decision-making, revisiting key
decisions, allowing appeals by patients or their doctors, and
reconsidering specific persons for access to limited resources, are
essential to the integrity of the process.
CONCLUSION
Initial conceptions of CSC in 2009 sought to ensure that plans would be in
place to save as many lives as possible during PHEs. Unprecedented conditions
experienced throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, however, exposed significant
law and policy challenges in operationalizing CSC, principally: (1) uncertainty
over legal triggers; (2) inadequate regional coordination; (3) emergence of
discriminatory impacts; and (4) divergent “tie-breaker” decisions. Each of these
legal conundrums is solvable. To the extent CSC is triggered when extended
resource shortages combined with sustained patient surges during PHEs
necessitate shifts in how care is allocated, supporting legal mechanisms extend
well beyond state-based emergency declarations. Improving regional
coordination relies on advance uniform understandings of CSC, alongside
governmental surveillance and other efforts to facilitate shared operations in
PHEs. Limiting discriminatory impacts in CSC implementation requires
adherence to principles of health justice in CSC plans, as well as real-time
adaptations based on new information. Tie-breaking decisions over patient
access to specific limited resources must avoid legally prohibited factors in favor
of equitable, defensible criteria. Future applications of CSC must ensure that
real-time allocations and decisions during emergencies are fair, effective, and
essential toward reducing morbidity and mortality.
367. See Civil Rights and COVID-19, supra note 310 (encouraging “reasonable modifications” for
patients with disabilities when using scoring systems or other clinical instruments to assess survival).

